Glossar-English:Symbol, Index, Icon

Sub-Item to: Sign theories: Overview

Original: Symbol, Index, Ikon

---

Peirce's classification of signs Figure 1: Small overview of the threefold tripartite base division of Peirce's sign concepts Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) is considered one of the founding fathers of modern sign theory. He is also responsible for a differentiated classification of sign types (Fig. 1), at least part of which has been widely used. Roughly sketched, Peirce distinguishes three sign-relevant levels, which approximately correspond to the division into pragmatics, semantics, and syntax. Within each of these levels, he introduces a further tripartite division. Syntactically, Peirce differentiates signs into »sinsigns«, »legisigns«, and »qualisigns«, while »rheme«, »dicent«, and »delome« form pragmatic (effect-related) sign subcategories. It is primarily the semantic level whose Peirce's tripartite division resonates powerfully among semioticians and theorists of neighboring disciplines, such as philosophy of language and art history, and which is highly relevant to image theory, not least in his concept of iconicity. Semantic tripartition: Peculiarities of the relationship of meaning Because they are focused on the semantic level, the Peircean sign categories​​​ »index«,​ »icon«​ and​​​ »symbol«​ differentiate the class of signs according to the character of the relationship established between the sign- bearer and the one with it designated (characterized as 'object reference' in Fig. 1). This “object” relationship is considered constitutive of the meaning ascribed to the sign-bearer. [3] Strictly speaking, the three categories are ideal types; in concrete cases, the associated meaning relations often work together in a complicated way (see the detailed example below ). Since they are focused on the semantic level, Peirce's sign categories »index«,​ »icon«​, and​​​ »symbol«​ differentiate the class of signs according to the character of the relation established between the sign-carrier and what is signified by it (characterized as ‘object reference’ in fig. 1). This “object” relation is considered constitutive of the meaning attributed to the sign carrier. Strictly speaking, the three categories are ideal types; in concrete cases, the associated meaning relations often interact in complicated ways (cf. the detailed example below). Iconicity and Resemblances The Peircian expression ‘icon’,[4] which obviously shares its ancient Greek root (εἰκών, roughly ‘image’) with both the medieval religious icons and the pictographic ‘icons’ of the information age (see ⊳ Pictographic Writing and Pictogram), but should not be confused with either, denotes such signs whose meaning relationship is due to a resemblance relation between sign carrier and signified (cf. [Peirce 1983a]Peirce, Charles S. (1983): Phänomen und Logik der Zeichen. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. Nicht angezeigt: hg. u. übers. v. Helmut Pape : p. 64). This applies, among other things, to “natural” images (mirror image) as well as to “normal” figurative images (phantom sketch),[5] to “Foley's” (sound produced by a sound specialist for radio play, movie, or computer game) and synthetic smells (artificial strawberry aroma), as well as in the verbal realm to onomatopoeic words (‘cuckoo’), form-iconic expressions (‘T-beams’), and – to a certain extent – to [[Sprachliche Metaphern und allgemeine Metaphorologie|metaphors (“verbal images”). Figure 2: Sketch of different conceptions of resemblance: (a) “self-resemblance” as exemplification (Peirce's genuine icon: ‹deer exemplifies »having antlers«›); (b) ontological resemblance concept; (c) epistemic resemblance concept; (d) action-theoretical resemblance concept. In fact, for Peirce, real (genuine) icons exist only when one uses a property of an object (perceived as a sign-carrier) to draw one's (or another's) attention to that very property – that is, when, in Goodman's terminology, there is an exemplification. Peirce describes signs in which one object refers to another object because of shared properties as ‘hypoicons’ (also ‘degenerate icons’ [Peirce 1998a]Peirce, Charles S. (1998): Collected Papers, Vol. 2: Elements of Logic. Thoemmes, Bristol. Nicht angezeigt: ed. by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss : §276). Yet it is precisely this derivative characterization that has prevailed for the concept »icon« most often used in semiotics. What remains open at first is which conception of »resemblance« is actually to be used. If one starts from an “ontologically” conceived concept of similarity, the resemblance relation represents a relation existing “in itself” between two objects, not depending on the specific perceptual and cognitive abilities of someone judging similarity. An “epistemically” conceived concept of similarity, on the other hand, would fall back on what appears similar to a certain observer. Only insofar as a part of the “property structure” of a thing (conceived as objective or subjective) is reflected in the property structure of another thing, the latter can be used as an iconic sign for the former – and vice versa. In a “behavioristic” (more precisely: action-theoretic) concept of similarity, the focus shifts to the fact that an observer assesses whether an observed entity's behavior gives rise to the claim that it has recognized something as similar to something else. These approaches account for the fact that introspective justifications for similarity attributions alone are not sufficient to reach intersubjective agreement about iconicity (cf. [Schirra & Sachs-Hombach 2013a]Schirra, Jörg R.J. & Sachs-Hombach, Klaus (2013): The Anthropological Function of Pictures. In: Sachs-Hombach, K. & Schirra, J.R.J. (Hg.), Origins of Pictures. Anthropological Discourses in Image Science. Halem, Köln. ). In principle, already a single (objective or subjective) property that – besides any number of different ones – is shared by the considered objects is sufficient in each case, in order to guarantee the iconicity of a sign relation between them. The greater the similarity, the stronger the iconicity when one object is considered as a sign for the other. Problems arise, on the other hand, when all properties coincide: Two objects are usually considered »similar« in the narrow sense only if there is also at least one property in which they are not alike. Indexicality and spatiotemporal relationships Peirce speaks of an ‘index’ (plural ‘indices’ or ‘indexes’) in the case of a sign whose bearer is used as a sign for the signified due to its spatiotemporal and especially causal connection with the signified (cf. [Peirce 1983a]Peirce, Charles S. (1983): Phänomen und Logik der Zeichen. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. Nicht angezeigt: hg. u. übers. v. Helmut Pape : p. 65): if, for instance, smoke is the sign for fire or red skin spots the sign for (an infection with) measles. Everything that, in the corresponding natural sciences from physics to medicine, is regarded as an effect or symptom of a phenomenon X, thus also constitutes a Peircean index for X. Strictly speaking, therefore, an indexical sign refers less to another object than to the presence of another object in direct proximity to the sign carrier. This clearly distinguishes indices from the other two types of signs, which are rather used to denote what is absent. However, what exactly is to be understood as »proximity to the sign carrier« can depend on various factors. In the case of a track, for instance, the temporal coincidence may be more or less extended into the past: The hare producing the track, for example, may be long gone by the time the hunter uses it as an indexical sign for the hare (or, more precisely, its presence). Causal chains can contribute to an almost arbitrarily large spatial extent of the proximity region under consideration. What is essential for indexicality is that the area that the sign user regards as the (extended) “here and now” always contains the signified as well as the sign carrier, so that, in a sense, one could also point one's finger at it. It should be noted, however, that the definition of indexicality does not necessarily assume a natural relationship between the sign carrier and the signified: Even the city entrance sign at the edge of a city stands in a direct, albeit intentionally generated, spatiotemporal relationship to the signified (the edge of that city). The same applies to the logo shown in the upper left corner of this glossary page (which marks: ›this is a page of the Glossary of Image Philosophy‹), the colored markings that indicate in this glossary text where another page can be reached by mouse click, or arrows and pointers in general. Not all indices are symptoms in the narrow (physical-causal) sense, or, as it is then also called: ‘natural indices’. In contrast to the natural ones, the spatiotemporal relation that mediates between sign carrier and signified is generated with intention in the case of the artificial indices – thus, intentionality replaces causality in these cases. Nevertheless, the semantic point also in this subclass is that the spatio-temporal proximity alone already seems to induce the sign's meaning when it is used. Verbal expressions, such as in particular ‘here’ and ‘now’, but also ‘I’, ‘we’, ‘you’, and ‘your’ (etc.), also depend in their respective meaning strongly on the context of their use: The spatiotemporal relation to place and time of their utterance determines which place is meant by ‘here’, which person is meant by ‘you’. The same is true, of course, for ‘içi’ or ‘hier’, for ‘tu’ or ‘Du’ – to take just two other European languages as examples. Besides all conventionality, which actually makes these kinds of expressions symbols in Peirce's sense, a moment of indexicality remains essential to them, which is why one also speaks of ‘indexical expressions’. Photographs ( and the products of related technical imaging processes) represent another special case of indexical signs: Obviously, the production processes for sign carriers considered here are based on the fact that a more or less long but continuous chain of strictly causal, physical-​chemical steps automatically removes the sign carrier from the denoted ('depicted') derive. [17] Although the images can actually be assigned to the iconic signs , at least in this subset indexicality also resonates in their term. [18] Photographs (and the products of related technical imaging processes) represent another special case of indexical signs: Obviously, the production processes for sign carriers considered here are based on the fact that a more or less long but continuous chain of strictly causal, physical-chemical steps automatically derives the sign carrier from the signified (‘depicted’). Although, as images, they actually belong to the iconic signs, at least in the case of this subset, indexicality also resonates in their concept. Symbolicity and meaning conventions Icons resemble indices in one important respect in which the third semantic sign category of Peirce deviates: Because of the directly recognizable connection between sign carrier and signified, the sign's meaning does not seem to have to be established first by a suitable act of baptism. Indices and icons function without prior establishment of a corresponding meaning convention. This is by no means true for many of the sign uses we perform in everyday life, as anyone who wants to learn a foreign language can easily find out for themselves. Signs whose meaning relation must be established with the help of a convention are called '‘symbols’' by Peirce (cf. [Peirce 1983a]Peirce, Charles S. (1983): Phänomen und Logik der Zeichen. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. Nicht angezeigt: hg. u. übers. v. Helmut Pape : p. 65ff.). Figure 3: Sketch of the problem around the German expressions ‘Zeichen’ (sign) and ‘Symbol’ (symbol) A difficulty must be mentioned with the expressions for sign and symbol in German: ‘Zeichen’ and ‘Symbol’ (with the corresponding plural forms ‘Zeichen’ and ‘Symbole’). In the German-speaking world, the Peircean usage differs clearly from another convention (also used by Saussure), which contrasts the ‘Zeichen’ with the ‘Symbol’, whereby ‘Symbol’ in this sense is often used synonymously with ‘emblem’. Marking the different word usages with the indices ‘D’ (Deutsch/German) and ‘P’ (Peirce), we get (Fig. 3): »SymboleD« are exactly not »ZeichenD«, while »SymboleP« are a subspecies of »ZeichenP«; furthermore, »SymboleP« largely correspond to »ZeichenD«, whereas »SymboleD« roughly correspond to Peirce's »icons«, i.e. although not being »ZeichenD« they rather are »ZeichenP«. Incidentally, a conventional attribution of meaning is not only present when a rule is explicitly laid down on which one can rely in case of doubt (an act of baptism in the broad sense). It can also be a matter of historically grown habits or tacit (implicit) agreements, as is the case with most signs of “natural” languages, such as the words and sentences of German. Here, there are no demonstrable situations with corresponding meaning-giving acts to which one could refer in case of suspicion of incorrect use of the symbolic sign. Moreover, as a rule, the social mechanisms that have contributed to the formation of the tradition continue to operate, which is why traditions change continuously “in one's back” (»language change«). In contrast to traditional meaning conventions, on the other hand, explicitly agreed sign meanings can only be changed again by further explicit agreements of the sign users concerned. Although related, the concepts »convention« and »arbitrariness« should not be confused in this context: Even traditional conventions are usually motivated in one way or another and are not purely arbitrary. And even the freely available association possibilities are hardly ever really exhausted in the case of explicitly agreed conventions, for good (such as mnemonic) reasons. Historically, the question of the arbitrariness of the meaning relation in the form of the phýsei/thései debate in Greek antiquity formed the essential starting point for the successive differentiation of possible object relations up to Peirce (and beyond). But in the course of this conceptual unfolding, it became clear that it is less about the question of a naturally (i.e. independently of sign users) existing relation between sign (carrier) and signified, but rather about different possibilities of integrating aspects of an object used as sign carrier into the complex occurrences of sign actions (cf. [Trabant 1996a]Trabant, Jürgen (1996): Elemente der Semiotik. Franke, Tübingen. , para. II.4). An example of this connection can be “seen” in the discussion of perspective as a symbolic form[26] (cf. [Panofsky 1924a]Panofsky, Erwin (1998): Die Perspektive als symbolische Form (1924). In: Michels, K. & Warnke, M. (Hg.), Erwin Panofsky, Deutschsprachige Aufsätze, Bd. 2. Akademie, Berlin. Nicht angezeigt: Erstpublikation in: <em>Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg (1924/25)</em>. Leipzig, 1927, 258-330 ). It is true that central-perspective constructions seem to produce particularly natural-looking pictorial signs in a quasi-causal derivation. But it is not about these signs at all. Rather, the construction itself – taken as a sign for the seeing that establishes that naturalness in the first place – is only one (historically developed) possibility among many others; a possibility that, since it presupposes a one-eyed, simultaneous seeing with a fixed gaze, despite all iconic parts (i.e., existing similarities to the meaning of this sign), does not have any meaning. This possibility, since it assumes a one-eyed, simultaneous seeing with a fixed gaze, is, despite all iconic parts (i.e. existing similarities to the meaning of this sign, namely the two-eyed, saccadic seeing with moving eyes), also strongly dependent on traditional-conventional factors: the convention, that is, that seeing is to be represented in exactly this manner (cf. [Cassirer 1930a]Cassirer, Ernst (2004): Mythischer, ästhetischer und theoretischer Raum (1930). In: Recki, B. (Hg.), Ernst Cassirer: Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 17. Meiner, Hamburg. ). Application to images: A (complex) example According to these premises, images have often been interpreted as the prototype of the iconic sign and occasionally even confused with the icon altogether [...] However, there are images that are to a greater extent iconic, those that are more indexical, and others that are predominantly symbolic. The criterion of the proportion of iconic, indexical, and symbolic elements allows us to determine three prototypes in the cultural history of the image. Accordingly, the prototype of the iconic image is not a figurative painting, but rather a non-figurative, abstract painting. The prototype of the indexical image is photography as well as figurative painting, and the prototype of the symbolic image is the iconologically or iconographically codified painting. ([Nöth 2009a]Nöth, Winfried (2009): Bildsemiotik. In: Sachs-Hombach, K. (Hg.), Bildtheorien. Anthropologische und kulturelle Grundlagen des Visualistic Turn. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. , p. 243f.) From the perspective of image science, iconicity (insofar as »image« and »resemblance« are related) and indexicality (especially in the case of causal imaging processes) play the greater, but by no means the sole, role. Numerous symbolic aspects also appear in image uses. In practice, prototypical cases of iconicity, indexicality, or symbolicity are indeed unlikely to occur frequently in images or even in other types of signs. Mixed forms dominate our image (sign) use. Figure 4: A shadow in Hiroshima — August 6, 1945, 8:15 am Applying the three aspects to a concrete example may better illustrate how manifold the semantic relations ultimately work together for a single image carrier: Figure 4 reproduces a black-and-white photograph by an unknown photographer, presumably taken in the last days of 1945 and housed in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum. Two steps of a stone staircase leading to the entrance of the Sumitomo Bank building in the center of the Japanese city of Hiroshima can be seen, as well as a small section of the wall of the building. Blackish marks in the outline of a human body, distorted in perspective, stand out on the steps. They are believed to have been created when an atomic bomb destroyed the city at 8:15 a.m. on August 6, 1945, and pressure, heat, and radiation burned into the stone the incandescent remains of a person who happened to be standing on the steps in front of the building at that time. Iconicity, indexicality, and symbolicity of the sample photograph Due to the longish but consistently causal chain of optical, photochemical, and digital transformations that connect the sign carrier under consideration here with the recording situation in Hiroshima at an unknown point in time shortly after the bomb explosion, the sign used with it obviously has an index character. Since there is also a visual similarity to the actual steps in Japan, there is also a clear iconic component. Symbolicity is added because the significance of this image can only become clear when it is placed in its historical context: Although – iconically – a kind of human shadow can be seen, which – indexically – is understood as part of a scene that actually exists in space and time (i.e. causally connected to the here and now of the reception situation), the fact that this photograph may also serve, for example, as a sign of the terrible violence of an atomic bomb explosion over inhabited territory is only revealed within a framework of understanding established by convention. Iconicity, indexicality, and symbolicity of the depicted “shadow” In fact, iconicity, indexicality, and symbolicity can also be applied on a second level in this example (as in almost all images, by the way): For the “shadow” itself is, as a rule, also read as a sign. As a symptom of the explosion causing it, it can be used as an index for all the factors contained in the causal chain leading to it: Dominant in this respect are certainly the person who stood in that place at that fateful moment, the radiations that burned the shadow into the stone at that moment, and the event that caused the radiation: the explosion of «Little Boy»". The condition for such an indexical sign use with one of these meanings is the embedding of the “shadow” in communicative interaction (including self-presentation of the sender) with conscious control of the communicative purpose of the action (reflexivity including anticipation of the communication partner; ⊳ Image reception as a communication process). This condition is also fulfilled if someone makes themselves aware of the corresponding cause on the spot with the help of the “shadow”. Insofern der “Schatten” eine gewisse Ähnlich­keit mit jenem Menschen hat, kann er zudem als ein iko­nisches Zeichen für jenen stehen. Auch hier ist die Einbet­tung in den komple­xen Handlungs­zusam­menhang einer Zeichen­verwen­dung Voraus­setzung. Ana­log zur Verlän­gerung der inde­xika­lischen Aspek­te des Darge­stellten durch die Inde­xika­lität der Darstel­lung “verlän­gert” die Iko­nizi­tät des Bildes die iko­nischen Aspek­te des im Bild Darge­stellten. Als einem symbolischen Zeichen kann man sich dem “Schatten” schließlich zuwen­den, wenn man damit etwa die eige­ne Aufmerk­samkeit oder die eines ande­ren absicht­lich auf den Sachver­halt lenken möchte, dass die Menschheit mit der in Hiro­shima erstmals grauen­voll demon­strierten Fähig­keit, Atom­bomben über bevöl­kerten Städten explo­dieren zu lassen, eine gefähr­liche Grenze über­schritten hat. Ikonizität, Indexikalität und Symbol­haftig­keit des refle­xiv genutz­ten Photos Eine dritte Bedeutungsebene ergibt sich, wenn wir in Betracht ziehen, dass jedes Bild auch dazu benutzt werden kann, als Zeichen für einen Aspekt des Zeichen­gebrauchs selbst zu dienen (⊳ Bild in refle­xiver Verwen­dung). Eben dies ist ja unter ande­rem in diesem Glossar­arti­kel mit dem Zeichen­träger aus Abbil­dung 4 gesche­hen. Auch auf dieser Ebe­ne können die drei Arten von Objekt­bezü­gen auftre­ten: Ikonizität als Exem­plifi­kation einer konkre­ten Eigen­schaft des aktu­ellen Zeichen­handlungs­schemas: Z.B. kann mithil­fe des Bildträ­gers darauf aufmerk­sam gemacht werden, dass die Bedeu­tungen jeder seiner Zeichen­verwen­dungen iko­nische, inde­xika­lische und symbo­lische Aspek­te umfasst, indem eben diese Eigen­schaft am Exem­pel demon­striert wird. Indexikalität als Verweis auf die gerade im Kontext ablau­fende Zeichen­handlungs­instan­zen und ihre Eigen­heiten: So kann sich ein Leser dieses Text-​Bild-​Ensem­bles etwa mithil­fe des Zeichen­trägers aus Abbil­dung 4 darauf aufmerk­sam machen, dass die Bedeu­tungen, die er ihm in verschie­denen Instan­ziierun­gen der Zeichen­handlung im Verlauf der Lektü­re des umge­benden Textes gibt, sich wandeln und etwa mal mehr, mal weni­ger iko­nisch oder inde­xika­lisch bestimmt sind. Symbolhaftigkeit, insofern alle abstrak­ten Eigen­schaften des Zeichen­handlungs­schemas, auf die mit der refle­xiven Verwen­dung des Bildträ­gers verwie­sen werden kann, wegen ihrer Abstrakt­heit konven­tionell (oder tradi­tionell) etab­liert worden sind: Dass eine Bildver­wendung Begrif­fe wie​ »syntak­tische Dichte«,​ »genu­ine Iko­nizi­tät«​ oder​ »Ästhe­tisie­rung eines Sujets«​ exem­plifi­zieren kann hat stets auch eine regel­bezo­gene Kompo­nente. Das gilt insbe­sonde­re für Fälle nega­tiver Exem­plifi­kation, bei denen defi­nitions­gemäß keine iko­nischen oder inde­xika­lischen Momen­te auftre­ten können. — In jedem konkreten Gebrauch des in Abbil­dung 4 wieder­gege­benen Zeichen­trägers können auf den erwähn­ten drei Zeichen­ebe­nen die drei von Peirce inspi­rierten Objekt­bezü­ge in jeweils verschie­denen Ausprä­gungen und variie­renden Kombi­nati­onen die effek­tive Kommu­nika­tion seman­tisch prägen. Vor diesem Hinter­grund ist die Vorstel­lung von einer einzi­gen »Bedeu­tung eines Bildträ­gers« besten­falls stark verkürzt und stets abhän­gig von einer – meist nur impli­zit – als Standard festge­legten Refe­renzver­wendungs­weise, zu der ein Begriff von standar­disier­ten Kommu­nizie­renden mit bestimm­tem Hinter­grundwis­sen eben­so wie standar­disier­te Kommu­nika­tionszie­le gehö­ren (z.B. iko­nische, nicht-​refle­xive Verwen­dung). Semi­ose – bei Peirce als fortlau­fende Erzeu­gung weite­rer Inter­pretan­ten gedacht, genau­er: als Folge (menta­ler) Zeichen, die die Bedeu­tung des ersten Zeichens ela­borieren – kann offen­sichtlich auch noch in einem ande­ren Sinn verstan­den werden: als ein sukzes­sives Ausar­beiten der verschie­denen Möglich­keiten, einen Zeichen­träger als Zeichen zu verwen­den. Für die Frage nach der Iden­tität bildhaf­ter Zeichen verschiebt sich der Fokus von einem am physi­schen Bildträ­ger orien­tierten Krite­rium zu einem an der jewei­ligen Verwen­dungssi­tuati­on orien­tierten Krite­rium. See also: Ähnlichkeit Bedeutung und Referenz Bilderschrift und Piktogramm Bildrezeption als Kommunikationsprozess Bild in reflexiver Verwendung Digitales Bild Griechisch: ‘agalma’, ‘phantasma’, ‘eidolon’, ‘typos’, ‘eikon’ Identität bildhafter Zeichen Ikone Ikonografie, Ikonologie, Ikonik Interaktion und Kommunikation Interaktions-, Selbst- und Sachbezug Kontext Linguistic turn, pictorial turn, medial turn Metonymie "natürliche" Bilder Nomination Perspektive und Projektion Pragmatik, Semantik, Syntax Proposition Referenz, Denotation, Exemplifikation Sehen Sprachliche Metaphern und allgemeine Metaphorologie Weltbild, Lebensform Zeichen, Zeichenträger, Zeichensystem Zeigen und Sich-Zeigen

Notes Literature [Berndt & Drügh 2009a] Berndt, Frauke & Drügh, Heinz J. (Hg.) (2009): Symbol – Grundlagentexte aus Ästhetik, Poetik und Kulturwissenschaft . Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M.[Birk et al. 2014a]Birk, Elisabeth & Halawa, Mark A. & Mosbach, Doris (2014): Semiotik. In: Netzwerk Bildphilosophie (Hg.), Bild und Methode. Theoretische Hintergründe und methodische Verfahren der Bildwissenschaft. Halem, Köln.[Cassirer 1930a]Cassirer, Ernst (2004): Mythischer, ästhetischer und theoretischer Raum (1930). In: Recki, B. (Hg.), Ernst Cassirer: Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 17. Meiner, Hamburg.[Cassirer 2009a]Cassirer, Ernst (2009): Der Begriff der symbolischen Form im Aufbau der Geisteswissenschaften. In: Schriften zur Philosophie der symbolischen Formen. Meiner, Hamburg.[Goodman 1970a]Goodman, Nelson (1970): Seven Strictures on Similarity. In: Foster, L. & Swanson, J. W. (Hg.), Experience and Theory. University of Massachusetts, Amherst.[Nöth 2009a]Nöth, Winfried (2009): Bildsemiotik. In: Sachs-Hombach, K. (Hg.), Bildtheorien. Anthropologische und kulturelle Grundlagen des Visualistic Turn. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M.[Panofsky 1924a]Panofsky, Erwin (1998): Die Perspektive als symbolische Form (1924). In: Michels, K. & Warnke, M. (Hg.), Erwin Panofsky, Deutschsprachige Aufsätze, Bd. 2. Akademie, Berlin.[Peirce 1983a]Peirce, Charles S. (1983): Phänomen und Logik der Zeichen. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M.[Peirce 1998a]Peirce, Charles S. (1998): Collected Papers, Vol. 2: Elements of Logic. Thoemmes, Bristol.[Platon 1922a]Platon (1922): Kratylos. Meiner, Leipzig.[Schelske 2000a]Schelske, Andreas (2000): Bedeutung oder Bezeichnung. In: Sachs-Hombach, K. & Rehkämper, K. (Hg.), Vom Realismus der Bilder. Scriptum, Magdeburg.[Schirra & Sachs-Hombach 2013a]Schirra, Jörg R.J. & Sachs-Hombach, Klaus (2013): The Anthropological Function of Pictures. In: Sachs-Hombach, K. & Schirra, J.R.J. (Hg.), Origins of Pictures. Anthropological Discourses in Image Science. Halem, Köln.[Trabant 1996a]Trabant, Jürgen (1996): Elemente der Semiotik. Franke, Tübingen. Version 1: 2013 Responsible: Schirra, Jörg R.J. Editing: Sachs-Hombach, Klaus Contributions by: Joerg R.J. Schirra und Marcel Lemmes — (Note) Quote as: [Schirra 2013g-y]Schirra, Jörg R.J. (2013). Symbol, Index, Ikon. (Ausg. 1). In: Schirra, J.R.J.; Halawa, M. & Liebsch, D. (Hg.), Glossar der Bildphilosophie. (2012-2026). [bildglossar.org/index.php?title=Symbol,_Index,_Ikon]. Webadresse: bildglossar.org/index.php?title=Symbol,_Index,_Ikon Schirra, Jörg R.J. (2013). Symbol, Index, Icon. (Ausg. 1). In: Schirra, J.R.J.; Halawa, M. & Liebsch, D. (Hg.), Glossar der Bildphilosophie. (2012-2026). [bildglossar.org/index.php?title=Glossar-English:Symbol,_Index,_Icon].