Glossar-English:Predication

Sub-Item to: Sign theories: Overview

Original: Prädikation

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Predication as an unsaturated partial action of propositions Along with nomination, predication forms the second central partial sign act of the propositional angle of statements. Predication is the partial action of communicating or suggesting that a collective habit of distinguishing is now relevant and applicable to the objects picked out by the nominations of the propositions from the discourse universe shared with the communication partners involved. Reference is thus made to a kind of abstract standard for the dimension of distinction under consideration, traditionally called ‘a concept’. That is also meant to communicate something that was not yet known to the interlocutor – contrasting to nominations (cf. [Kamlah & Lorenzen 1973a]Kamlah, Wilhelm & Lorenzen, Paul (1973): Logische Propädeutik. Vorschule des vernünftigen Redens. BI Wissenschaftsverlag, München. Nicht angezeigt: 2. Aufl. (<sup>1</sup>1967, <sup>3</sup>1996) : § 2, and [Gerhardus et al. 1975a]Gerhardus, Dietfried; Kledzik, Silke M. & Reitzig, Gerd H. (1975): Schlüssiges Argumentieren – Logisch-propädeutisches Lehr- und Arbeitsbuch. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen. : p. 25). Since the nominatory use of images remains very problematic, while at the same time, an equation with propositions is considered unconvincing due to the lack of functional internal division, many image scientists assume that picture usages are to be interpreted fundamentally as predications (cf. [Goodman 1968a]Goodman, Nelson (1968): Languages of Art. Hackett, Indianapolis. Notiz: 2. rev. Aufl. 1976 Nicht angezeigt: dt.: Sprachen der Kunst. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1998 or [Sachs-Hombach 2003a]Sachs-Hombach, Klaus (2003): Das Bild als kommu­nika­tives Medium. Ele­mente einer allge­meinen Bild­wissen­schaft. Halem, Köln. ). Types and requirements of predication Predications can bring into play simple, distinctive habits, i.e., only a single concept at a time, or complex, distinctive habits composed of multiple concepts: ‹... is red› vs. ‹... is red and green striped with yellow dots framed in purple›. Moreover, the single-argument predicative predications present in these examples are distinguished from multi-argument relational predications, such as '‹... negotiates with ... about ...›. Since two cases are differentiated with a distinctive practice, predications always occur in pairs: for example, ‹... is red› and ‹... is not red› (or ‹... is unred›). The relation between the two aspects of the distinction under consideration is called internal negation. Evidently, a prerequisite for successful executions of predications is that the communication partners involved (a) have the same concepts and (b) use the same association between their concepts and corresponding verbal expressions. Concepts, conceptual arguments, and logical reasoning Suppose concepts are understood in Wittgenstein's sense as shared, communicatively negotiated, or at least communicatively negotiable habits of distinguishing. In that case, it follows that they must be understood as abstract aspects of certain communicative acts or, more precisely, of all acts explicating this concept. Their function is, in particular, to serve as points of reference for (interindividual) verification of the validity of assertive sentences. Thus, anyone who has the concept »X« should not only be able to distinguish instances of X from things (in the broad sense) that are not instances of X; they should also be able to explain what actually constitutes this difference; and they should be able to judge when someone has correctly used a corresponding classificatory expression (cf. [Ros 1999a]Ros, Arno (1999): Was ist Philosophie?. In: Raatzsch, R. (Hg.), Philo­sophie­ren über Philo­sophie. Leipziger Universitätsverlag, Leipzig. ). In order to check whether they mean the same concept, two communication partners must, therefore, turn to their respective conceptual explanations. The conceptual argumentations they conduct for this purpose are essentially based (i) on singular intensional propositions by which the respective concepts as abstract entities are attributed or denied certain properties or by which several concepts are put into certain relations with each other or else (ii) on extensional general statements about all objects that fall under the respective concepts and their necessary properties or relations. Both forms are equivalent, though it should be realized that the extensional form indeed expresses not assertions about the objects but proposals for the common practice of talking about these (kinds of) objects. Predication and descriptive noun phrases Obviously, predications are accomplished with expressions that can be used to communicate distinctions. Conversely, however, distinguishing expressions are not only used for predications. In particular, with descriptive noun phrases, there is a kind of nomination for which distinguishing expressions play a central role outside of predicative use. That shows the close entanglement between nomination – as the anchoring in what is already mutually known – and predication – as the aspect of the new, not yet jointly known – that is characteristic of propositions: Descriptive noun phrases take up, for the identification of objects, the distinctions that have been jointly established sometime before by a corresponding predication. This interplay of predication and descriptive nomination, which spans several propositions, is an essential condition for the possibility of interweaving statements into coherent texts. Images as Predications With the concept of exemplification, Nelson Goodman laid the foundation of most predication theories of images. In exemplification, a sign functions as a pattern by which a habit of distinguishing – more precisely, a concept – is brought into the communicative field by an instance that falls under that distinction. That happens with pictures, especially for color distinctions, shape concepts, and concepts for relative spatial arrangements. A picture presentation can, therefore, be understood as a corresponding predication. Obviously, as a rule, these must be rather complex predications because monochrome pictures, pictures with two or three color areas standing in a simple arrangement relation, or pictures with a single simple geometrical object make up only a tiny and rather subordinate part of all possible images. The majority, in particular, of figurative images, whose content consists essentially of spatial arrangements of (more or less) material bodies, bring into play the rather complex predication by which this particular kind of spatial arrangement of just this type of material object is distinguished from other arrangements of the same or other kinds of objects. The predication theory of image usage in the version outlined by [Sachs-Hombach 2003a]Sachs-Hombach, Klaus (2003): Das Bild als kommu­nika­tives Medium. Ele­mente einer allge­meinen Bild­wissen­schaft. Halem, Köln. also assumes that, in order to be used as an image at all, a concept is brought into the focus of attention of the person opposite (or to oneself in the role of another) by exemplarily “bringing before the eyes” some characteristic properties of what falls under that concept – insofar as those properties are considered important in the respective context. The primary function of bringing the concept into the focus of attention is to put the addressee in the position of being able to supplement the thereby determined habit of distinguishing into an entire proposition. Thus, the image is supposed to act as a pattern for the considered distinguishing habit – such as »(being) red« – with the help of which further individual objects can be judged with respect to this distinguishing dimension. Figure 1: Object „... looks like this (!)“ The standard function of the presentation of a photo, such as the example picture shown (Fig. 1), would then have to be predicatively understood as follows: „... looks like this (!)“, whereby the photo addresses a very complicated visual discriminating habit, which is verbally integrated by the deictic particle ‘(like) this’ as (part of) the predication (the ‘!’ marks the pointing gesture). This habit of discrimination, actually composed of many concepts, may, in a second step, be restricted to single components by which momentary visual appearances of spatial-material objects are distinguished from each other. In a third step, the part can then be taken for the whole: The example image then conveys something like the predication ‹... is a suspension bridge›. Pictorial nominations as derived usage Derived from the fundamentally predicative mode of usage, according to Sachs-Hombach, the concept, as such, can furthermore be introduced as a topic. Thus, an understanding of the pattern as such can be stimulated (analogous to possible employments of a general term in nominative usage: ‘red as such’): ‘the so (!) appearance as such’ (or ‘the concept of appearing so (!)’) or also ‘the concept of suspension bridges’. On the other hand, attention could also be directed to a particular instance of the concept (analogous to a deictic description: ‘this red suspension bridge’), about which something further is communicated (with another, for instance, verbal predication, e.g., ‘... was inaugurated in 1937.’). In both cases, the exemplary introduction of a particular complex visual ability to distinguish is a prerequisite, without which the nominatory usages would not be possible. Problems of the predication theory of images According to the predication theory of images, pictures are, in principle, “unsaturated” in communicative terms. They provide predicates that have to be supplemented and can then take on a predicative or nominatory function on a more complex level. The reason why we usually do not notice the communicative incompleteness of the use of images is that we have developed numerous conventions that suggest a corresponding supplementation in various contexts and which would, in this way, supplement more or less automatically. What seems problematic about the predication theory of images above all is that in using images, concepts are to be communicated exemplarily, i.e., via a corresponding instance falling under the respective concept. That is especially true for the representations of spatiotemporal material objects with their characteristic individuation criteria, which are regarded as central. Accordingly, to obtain the concept underlying the corresponding predication, an associated individual falling under the concept must first be available in order to, then, by utilizing it, draw attention to the concept. This function of making objects available, at least to some extent – the context-building act – would thus take precedence over the function of predication, which is made possible by it in the first place (cf. [Schirra 2006a]Schirra, Jörg R.J. (2006): Begriffsgenetische Betrachtungen in der Bildwissenschaft: Fünf Thesen. In: Sachs-Hombach, K. (Hg.), Bild und Medium. Kunstgeschichtliche und philosophische Grundlagen der interdisziplinären Bildwissenschaft. Halem, Köln. Webadresse: www.jrjs.de/Work/Papers/P06/P06-3/index.html ). Predication, predictor, predicate, and general term The verbal expressions through which predication is accomplished are called ‘predictors’. As a counterpart to the designation ‘singular terms’ for nominators, predictors are also called ‘general terms’ following an older tradition. Linguistically, the predicators are generally given by the verbs (in a broad sense) together with the indefinite noun phrases of the sentences under consideration and the prepositional phrases formed with them (unless those act as sentential adverbs). The expression ‘predicate’ is sometimes used synonymously with ‘predicator’ or ‘predication’, but this is not very fortunate because of its various broader meanings. Often, ‘predicate’ also denotes, as a grammatical term, the distinctive expressions, whether they are used predicatively or occur as part of a nomination in a descriptive noun phrase. See also: Context-building acts Excursus: Examples of conceptual statements Interactional, expressive, and propositional angles Nomination Proposition Reference, denotation, exemplification Sortal objects and individuation

Notes Literature [Carnap 1947a]Carnap, Rudolf (1947): Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic. Univ. Press, Chicago, IL.[Gerhardus et al. 1975a]Gerhardus, Dietfried; Kledzik, Silke M. & Reitzig, Gerd H. (1975): Schlüssiges Argumentieren – Logisch-propädeutisches Lehr- und Arbeitsbuch. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen.[Goodman 1968a]Goodman, Nelson (1968): Languages of Art. Hackett, Indianapolis.[Kamlah & Lorenzen 1973a]Kamlah, Wilhelm & Lorenzen, Paul (1973): Logische Propädeutik. Vorschule des vernünftigen Redens. BI Wissenschaftsverlag, München.[Ros 1999a]Ros, Arno (1999): Was ist Philosophie?. In: Raatzsch, R. (Hg.), Philo­sophie­ren über Philo­sophie. Leipziger Universitätsverlag, Leipzig.[Sachs-Hombach 2003a]Sachs-Hombach, Klaus (2003): Das Bild als kommu­nika­tives Medium. Ele­mente einer allge­meinen Bild­wissen­schaft. Halem, Köln.[Schirra 2006a]Schirra, Jörg R.J. (2006): Begriffsgenetische Betrachtungen in der Bildwissenschaft: Fünf Thesen. In: Sachs-Hombach, K. (Hg.), Bild und Medium. Kunstgeschichtliche und philosophische Grundlagen der interdisziplinären Bildwissenschaft. Halem, Köln.[Wittgenstein 1922a]Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1922): Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Kegan Paul, London. Version 1: 2013 Responsible: Schirra, Jörg R.J. Editing: Sachs-Hombach, Klaus Contributions by: Joerg R.J. Schirra und Marcel Lemmes — (Note) Quote as: Schirra, Jörg R.J. (2013). Predication. (Ausg. 1). In: Schirra, J.R.J.; Halawa, M. & Liebsch, D. (Hg.), Glossar der Bildphilosophie. (2012-2026). [bildglossar.org/index.php?title=Glossar-English:Predication].