Glossar-English:Interactional, Expressive, and Propositional Angles
Sub-Item to: Sign theories: Overview
Original: Interaktions-, Selbst- und Sachbezug
Special partial actions in the use of signsSince the use of a sign is a particular form of communicative interaction, particularly relevant aspects (in the sense of necessary partial actions) can be derived. On the one hand, every communicative interaction must have aspects that belong to it as a type of interaction. Essentially, it is about the parts of the respective action schemata that all interactions share, such as the roles of ‘sender’ and ‘receiver’ and, quite generally, the directionality of the sign from the sender to the receiver, as well as the type of interaction. This interactional angle of communicative interaction is expressed, in particular, in the fact that whoever uses a sign is always addressing someone to achieve something. The action components in which the interactional angle is conveyed are the illocutions. On the other hand, a sign act necessarily has aspects of a communicative interaction, notably including self-presentation. Anyone who uses a sign is not only addressing a recipient; in doing so, they must also relate in a unique manner to themselves, to their body, and to the situational embedding in which the sign act takes place. The action components in which this expressive angle of the communicative interaction is conveyed determine, among other things, its modality. The state of mind of the sender presented by the expressive angle can finally be differentiated with the use of signs to turn the sender towards a (perhaps fictitious) fact or object: This fact or object is then represented by the sign. The use of the sign can, therefore, refer to a specific fact to which the sender wishes to draw the recipient's attention. Propositions form the action components that convey the propositional angle of a sign action.[1]
Interactional, expressive, and propositional angles in the use of imagesThe problem of the possible interactional angles of image uses is dealt with in detail in image pragmatics (in particular ⊳ Reference, Denotation, Exemplification). On a general level, this also concerns whether it is possible to identify a fundamental illocutionary function of image use on which all other uses are based. In particular, what is the relationship between this and the assertion (for instance, ⊳ Context-Building Acts)? As with all sign acts, the interactional angle can also be modified in the use of images by internalizing the respective interaction partners: The image user can take on both roles at the same time and present themselves with an image carrier as an image. In fact, the number of such monological uses far exceeds that of genuinely dialogical image communication (⊳ also Image reception as a communication process). The expressive angle of an image use depends less on the distinction between producer and recipient, as one might initially assume, than on the type of image:
With regard to the propositional angle of image uses, one must first ask: Do pictures have a propositional angle at all? If so, how do they accomplish it? Explanations of these predominantly image-semantic questions can be found in the articles on the keywords Proposition, Predication, and Nomination.
Truthfulness and truthBy dividing a sign act into interactional, expressive, and propositional angles, two essential properties can be defined. Whereas truthfulness (sincerity) is associated with the interactional and expressive angles and assesses the relationship between the actual intention that the sender is pursuing with the sign act and the ostentatiously shown intention, truth is an evaluation of the propositional angle: the propositional angle of a sign act may or may not agree with the corresponding facts. Since truthfulness does not depend on the propositional angle, it is defined for all communicative interactions and, thus, also for the use of images. On the other hand, as long as it is not clear whether every image act has a propositional angle at all, talk of the truth of an image remains metaphorical at best. The concept of truth can only be directly applied to propositional image theories. For purely predicative or nominatory theories of the factual reference in images, the fundamental incompleteness of predication or nomination means that images cannot be directly true or false but must be supplemented with the missing components to form a proposition in the context of use. In modal image theories, on the other hand, the image use provides the context to which related propositions can be true or false; the concept of truth is then not applicable to images themselves. Ultimately, a-semiotic image theories must offer a concept of truth that is entirely independent of the concept of truth in sign theory, insofar as this aspect is considered at all.[3] See also:
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Notes
Literature
[Bühler 1933a]Bühler, Karl (1933): Axiomatik der Sprachwissenschaften. Klostermann, Frankfurt/M.[Ros 1984a]Ros, Arno (1984): Sach-, Selbst- und Fremdbezug in elementaren sprachlichen Handlungen. Zur Sprachtheorie G. H. Meads. In: Oehler, K. (Hg.), Zeichen und Realität. Stauffenburg, Tübingen. Version 1: 2013 Responsible: Editing: Contributions by: Joerg R.J. Schirra und Marcel Lemmes — (Note) Quote as: |