Glossar-English:Interaction and Communication

Sub-Item to: Sign theories: Overview

Original: Interaktion und Kommunikation

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What belongs to a sign action? No object is already a sign by itself. Something becomes a sign only because it is used in a certain way – in a particular social context of action, namely that of communicative interaction. That applies accordingly to pictures if they are regarded as signs. Communication and interaction, in other words, provide important boundary conditions for the use of images. Figure 1: Outline for embedding interaction and communication in the hierarchy of action concepts When we look at communication, we look at actions. Because only those who can perform actions are able to communicate, exchange information, or even thoughts. Actions involving several actors are also called interactions (Fig. 1). They often entail interactions in the opposite direction so that whole chains of interrelated actions can arise. Thus, in a fight between two dogs, each attacking action of one is directed at the other, which immediately reacts to it, for instance, with a defensive action, a counterattack, or an action of submission (cf. also [Mead 1968a]Mead, George Herbert (1968): Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. Nicht angezeigt: Original: <em>Mind, Self, and Society</em>. Hg. v. Charles W. Morris. Chicago, 1934 : p. 81f.). These interactions form a kind of choreography, which resembles turn-based games: For each “move” of one player, there is a usually narrowly limited set of correct subsequent moves of the other, with which the “game” can continue or be regularly terminated (‘language game’; ⊳ Illocution; cf. [Austin 1972a]Austin, John L. (1972): Zur Theorie der Sprechakte. Reclam, Stuttgart. Nicht angezeigt: orig.: How to do things with Words, 1962 and [Wittgenstein 1971a]Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1971): Philosophische Untersuchungen. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. ). Suppose one of the interaction partners does not behave accordingly. In that case, they have to expect sanctions, which in communicative action contexts can mean that they have to expect not to be understood, to reap contradiction, or to be asked for further clarifications of their statements. In general, actions are characterized by the fact that they are purposeful. Acts of communication, very generally speaking, have the prominent purpose of coordinating the further actions of the actors involved. That is obviously not already true for an act of attack or defense. If a dog tries to jump at the throat of the other dog or if the latter tries to avoid the first dog, this cannot (at least not necessarily) be subordinated to the purpose of coordinating the further actions of the two dogs. However, it looks somewhat different with the act of submission (which is accordingly also called submission gesture): This ‘laying on the back and presenting the defenseless throat’ is aimed directly at making it clear to the other dog that further attacks are unnecessary since no more attacks are undertaken. The (successful) submission gesture thus coordinates the further mutual behavior of the dogs. Direct, factual, and communicative interactions The example of fighting dogs also makes it clear that not all interactions are already communicative. In particular, a distinction has to be made between the following three cases (cf. [Ros 2005a]Ros, Arno (2005): Materie und Geist. Eine philosophische Untersuchung. Mentis, Paderborn. ): Direct interactions: This involves an individual attempting to affect at least one other individual physically. That may be an act of grooming (“lousing”) or a bite attack during a fight. Factual interactions: In this case, one being unintentionally familiarizes another being with a certain fact by putting the other being into a situation in which the other being can perceive that this and that is the case (showing as an indication). Cases of such factual interactions can be found, for example, when one leads by their drinking the other (e.g., a young animal) to a watering place (i.e., showing the other ‹that one can drink there›). Communicative interaction: This should only be employed in cases where an interaction partner tries to present themselves to the other interaction partner in a very specific manner as an agent to give the other one something to understand (showing as an ostentation). That is what happens in the case of the gesture of submission: The submitting one presents themselves as someone who recognizes the dominance of the other one, which they make them understand in precisely this way. While it is only possible with a factual interaction to convey to the respective counterpart insight into such facts that the latter can also perceive, with the help of communicative interactions, insights can also be conveyed into states of affairs that are not directly perceived by the counterpart: namely, insofar as the sender can present themselves to the receiver as someone who is confronted with that state of affairs. That sounds a bit complicated at first, but it captures, for example, just the situation in which certain primates use specific warning calls when perceiving snakes or birds of prey. The cry is only uttered when conspecifics are nearby to hear it. In the scream, the screamer presents themselves to others as someone confronted with the presence of a snake (or bird of prey, as may be the case). The reaction to the appearance of such an enemy must be different in each case (in the case of snakes, do not run into the obscure bushes; in the case of birds of prey, take cover in the bushes). It also occurs in individuals who only hear the warning call without having to have noticed the snake or the bird of prey themselves. Communication, in contrast to factual interaction, is thus always connected with a self-presentation of the sender, who must, therefore, not only establish a relationship with the receiver but also enter into a particular relationship with themselves and their body (⊳ Interactional, Expressive, and Propositional Angles). Finally, we should speak of sign acts exactly when an object (also body part) is used out of insight into the peculiarities of its communicative situation and for a communicative purpose the agents themselves recognize. The purposefulness of the interaction in which the sign is used is, thus, not simply determined by phylogenetic developmental processes or individual-historical learning processes but has become a purpose for the communicators themselves. Image usage as interaction and as communication Figure 2: Image presentation as factual interaction? (John Pugh: «Art imitating life imitating art imitating life», a mural with framing wall parts) Based on a trompe l'œil, it may at first appear as if pictures could also function merely as factual interactions: Since the painter of the trompe l'œil depicted in Figure 2 obviously makes it possible with the painted surface that their addressees can see certain facts for themselves: S/he shows them (in the sense of indication) a room in which, among many other things, there are two bistro tables, one of which serves as an armrest for a young, dark-haired woman dressed in black, who is completely absorbed in reading. The visual experience seems to be given quite immediately (⊳ also Evidence, Visual/Iconic). However, such an approach neglects the sign character of the image since, then, there is simply deception, i.e., the image is taken for what is depicted. Yet, that is precisely what image users do not do as a rule when using images. Instead, they are aware (at least to some extent) of the difference between the image carrier and what is depicted (⊳ Deceptive and Immersive Modes). They are also usually aware of the purpose they associate with presenting the image to someone. If one understands image use as communicative interaction, the following question arises immediately: How does the image user present themselves to the communication partner qua image use (⊳ Interactional, Expressive, and Propositional Angles), and who is the communication partner in case of doubt, for example, if one person alone looks at an image (⊳ Image reception as communication process)? Effects on other concepts The action aspects of image use are negotiated within the framework of image pragmatics. There, further aspects of image action can be found. These include, in particular, the relationship between affects and communication and the understanding of image reception as a communication process. The close relationship between the concept of sign and the concept of media is furthermore reflected in the entry Communication media. See also: Affect Body Communication media Deceptive and immersive modes Evidence, visual/iconic Experience / immediacy Illocution Image action Image pragmatics Image reception as a communication process Interactional, expressive, and propositional angles Sign, sign carrier, sign system

Notes Literature [Austin 1972a]Austin, John L. (1972): Zur Theorie der Sprechakte. Reclam, Stuttgart.[Bühler 2000a]Bühler, Karl (2000): Die Krise der Psychologie. Velbrück, Weilerswist.[Kamlah & Lorenzen 1973a]Kamlah, Wilhelm & Lorenzen, Paul (1973): Logische Propädeutik. Vorschule des vernünftigen Redens. BI Wissenschaftsverlag, München.[Mead 1968a]Mead, George Herbert (1968): Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M.[Ros 2005a]Ros, Arno (2005): Materie und Geist. Eine philosophische Untersuchung. Mentis, Paderborn.[Wittgenstein 1971a]Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1971): Philosophische Untersuchungen. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. Version 1: 2013 Responsible: Schirra, Jörg R.J. Editing: Halawa, Mark Contributions by: Joerg R.J. Schirra und Marcel Lemmes — (Note) Quote as: Schirra, Jörg R.J. (2013). Interaction and Communication. (Ausg. 1). In: Schirra, J.R.J.; Halawa, M. & Liebsch, D. (Hg.), Glossar der Bildphilosophie. (2012-2026). [bildglossar.org/index.php?title=Glossar-English:Interaction_and_Communication].