Glossar-English:Image in reflective use

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Sub-Item to: Types of image usage

Original: Bild in reflexiver Verwendung


The reflective use of sign acts

All signs or, more generally, all communicative and, thus, medial acts can be used not only for their actual (direct) purposes but also for symbolically extended communicative acts (metaphorical uses). They can also be employed to draw attention to aspects of communicative acts of precisely this type. Because of this back-reference to the performed communication action itself, this usage is called the reflexive usage of a communicative act. It includes example actions presented for the purpose of teaching, through which attention can be drawn to more or less all aspects of execution, as well as cited uses, in which, for instance, very particular conditions for the production of a corresponding sign carrier are (or are intended to be) brought into view.[1]

Applied to language, reflexively used verbal signs would, therefore, be such verbal utterances that are less about simply actualizing the speech act carried out with them normally. Instead, the performance of such a speech act, or at least a certain aspect, is intended to be emphasized as an example. Thus, the example sentences, which are usually not lacking in any linguistic article or textbook, are all to be understood as used reflexively: With the (repeated) utterance of the sentence ‘Jonas went home’ in the first section of Searle's «Speech Act Theory» ([Searle 1971a]Searle, John R. (1971): Sprechakttheorie - Ein sprachphilosophischer Essay. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M.
), for example, it is not intended to communicate or assert what is usually communicated or asserted under normal use conditions with the utterance of that sentence.[2] Rather, Searle's utterance serves here as an example for the utterance of sentences as such and for a mental phenomenon typically associated with it (that one means something with the utterance).

In principle, a close conceptual relationship exists between reflective uses and exemplification. However, the latter is usually understood primarily as a positive exemplification: The exemplifying action itself exhibits the aspect demonstrated as an example. However, the reflexive use of signs also includes cases of negative exemplification: With the use of a sign, for example, the absence of certain aspects that are usually important or unavoidable for sign acts of this type can be pointed out. For this reason, if communication fails, a reinterpretation as a reflexively intended usage can be employed to recognize (and possibly cover up) the mistake or mistakes in the communication action on the meta-level.[3]


Images in reflective use

Since all communicative or medial acts can be used reflectively, this type of use must also occur for the use of images – understood as media actions. In fact, one will sensibly analyze image quotations or images cited in other ways as reflective image uses since attention is drawn to aspects of the respective (direct, symbolically extended, or even already reflexively used) image use itself, just as the definition of reflective usage requires.

Figure 1: Series of images of the «Utah Tea Pot» with the actual aim of illustrating computer-graphic processes

Here, too, typical examples are images used in textbooks intended to draw attention to certain aspects of the creation and reception of images in the sense of positive exemplification. When, for example, a textbook on design theory uses an image with a particularly striking ›image-determining point‹ to address the concept of »image-determining points« or a picture with pronounced groups of Gestalts as an example of the Gestalt laws in visual perception. Also, the frequent occurrence of images of a particular type of teapot – the much-cited «Utah Tea Pot» – in textbooks on computer graphics is accordingly not to be interpreted in such a way that teapots of this kind represented an almost indispensable utensil for the operation of computer graphics. Rather, the focus here is on the effects of certain variations in the process of creating such images using a standardized (albeit virtual) object (Fig. 1).[4]

Negative exemplification is also possible and is not uncommon with images that are used reflectively: Breaking with an expectation serves as a reference to the meaning of this expectation as part of the “normal” medial context of use. Accordingly, even monochrome surfaces can be analyzed as images with negative exemplification via the reflective mode of use: They can be used to draw attention to everything that they lack in comparison to a “normal” image.[5]

Figure 2: (Initially) difficult-to-understand image of a Dalmatian

The effect of certain picture puzzles can also be analyzed as an attempt to communicate with an image that initially fails. Only the reflective use of the image as a strategy for recognizing and eliminating the medial error provides clues as to what is missing in this use of the image. That insight can be employed to understand the picture differently. The «Image of a Dalmatian» (Fig. 2), which is well-known in perceptual psychology, works in this sense.[6]

Apparently, in principle, all factors that are theoretically understood to be involved in the use of an image are also candidates for a positive or negative exemplification in a reflectively employed image, in particular, all sub-phenomena of image use that are defined by concepts from the theories of signs, media, and perception.


Medial effects of the reflective usage of images

Compared to the “direct” use (⊳ immersive mode), the reflective image use has specific consequences: It should be particularly emphasized that the reflective use usually presupposes the “normal” use conditions of the image but at the same time (partially) overrides them. As indicated in the above example of the «Utah Tea Pot» images in computer graphics, the semantic aspects often take a back seat to normal uses: It is no longer important what the image usually shows – such as a teapot. The usual semantic content is just one of an infinite number of others that are also possible, all of which could serve as carriers of a completely different message, which is what is actually at stake now, namely that one can create such an image with this or that form of a computer-graphic procedure.[7]

Such a shielding of the actual semantic content is also known from quotations and citations in other media or sign systems. It is a special manifestation of a more general receding from normal pragmatic aspects in reflective versus non-reflective use. For example, those who merely quote a promise are generally not willing to guarantee that they will keep it – something that is part of the normal use conditions of the promise. The following example may serve as a visual equivalent: Let us compare the image of a surveillance camera, on the one hand, in regular use and, on the other hand, in reflective use, for example, in the catalog of the manufacturer of the surveillance system. In the first case, one of the ordinary conditions of use is that the image users focus their attention on the situation in front of the camera and react accordingly to the scene seen in the image. Nothing of the kind applies if the very image carrier is to be used in the catalog to advertise the surveillance system – and, thus, to draw attention to certain aspects of the creation and normal use of that (kind of) image.

The switching off of the standard pragmatic connections is due in particular to the fact that in the case of reflective uses, the image users themselves are not simply agents in a communication action but also focus on themselves as communicators in this action (⊳ Image reception as a communication process). Thus, even those who consider a particular picture, for example, by Picasso, to be a ‘typical Picasso’ are already using this picture in a reflective manner. The same applies to those who confront a picture as an observer of their viewing of the picture. With this image use, they also focus on a certain aspect of the non-reflective image use. The actual communication act differs significantly from the direct use of images, so completely different pragmatic rules must be followed.

The reflective usage of a sign can itself be employed in a reflective way. We have done so, for instance, in this text when we have given examples of reflective use. Such potentiated reflective uses occur rather seldom in everyday life but could play a certain role in art criticism.


Connections with other concepts

The reflectively used image and the self-referentiality of the material: Occasionally, especially in the context of non-figurative images but also in the context of the reference discussion of digital media, we encounter the formulation that such images are self-referential, that they merely refer to their own materiality. This talk of the self-referentiality of the material is closely related to the reflective uses of images that draw attention to (in the broadest sense) syntactic aspects of the image being viewed or, more generally, to its image type (⊳ Materiality and Image Syntax). The unique feature of non-figurative images – such as monochrome surfaces or abstract ornaments – is that they do not seem to have any (obvious) semantic dimension. Assuming that images normally (i.e., when intended for direct use) have a more or less obvious meaning or a meaning assigned via a legend, this break with a communication expectation should trigger the switch to reflective use. So, the thesis is suggestive that purely non-representational images allow only reflexive usage (⊳ Semantics of non-figurative images).

The reflexively used image and the fine arts: The concept of reflective use also seems relevant to the distinction between everyday and artistic images. Although everyday images, like all images, may also be used reflectively, reflective usage seems to be the norm in the case of pictures in the fine arts since here, when encountering the picture, attention is always directed to aspects of its production, materiality, or effect. At the most, reflexive uses are potentiated.[8]

The reflexively used image and the emphatic images of the Image debate: The so-called ‘emphatic images’ – G. Boehm also speaks of ‘strong images’ (cf. [Boehm 2007a]Boehm, Gottfried (2007): Wie Bilder Sinn erzeugen. Die Macht des Zeigens. Berlin University Press, Berlin.
: p. 252) – consistently are reflexively used pictures; after all, the pictorial quality of these pictures is assumed to show in a particularly emphasized way, or more precisely: should allow one to demonstrate it particularly clearly. However, when an image is used to draw attention, among other things, to what characterizes images (generally or of a particular variety), it is obviously used reflexively.

The reflexively used image and the identity of pictorial signs: Finally, one must ask whether it makes sense to say of one image that it can be used directly or reflexively (even at different levels of reflexivity) or whether with the different uses of the same image carrier quite different images are constituted. After all, the former is more in line with our everyday language practice. However, different opinions have been established in forming theories (⊳ Identity of Pictorial Signs and Identity Criteria for Image Carriers).

Notes
  1. ↑ It should be made clear that the reflection carried out is by no means the first in the overall complex of sign use: Even the simplest communicative behavior is necessarily associated with an act of self-portrayal, i.e., a simple form of reflection (⊳ Interaction and Communication). In the case of sign-like communications, another level of reflection occurs insofar as the sign users are now aware of their communicative activity (⊳ Sign, Sign Carrier, Sign System). Therefore, the reflective use of signs already represents (at least) the third level of reflection within the complex overall actions under consideration.
  2. ↑ For example, in that context, it remains entirely unclear who is actually meant by 'Jonas'; ⊳ nomination.
  3. ↑ In that case, I present the deficient sign to myself in a reflexive manner to draw my attention to faulty aspects of its use.
  4. ↑ Such a reading can be strengthened in particular by the fact that the image appears as part of a corresponding series so that the effect of different production procedures (or different parameters of a procedure) can be compared using the same image content.
  5. ↑ That does not mean that positive examples are not possible with monochrome surfaces used as pictures: They can also be used to refer to certain effects – such as affective ones – that can be triggered with them, although or precisely because of the usual local color variations and everything related to it is missing here.
  6. ↑ The reflective self-presentation of the picture after the first failed attempts to recognize anything in it at all leads to the realization that the lack of clear object contours makes it difficult to see objects and, thus, to interpret figurative images; with this understanding (and the knowledge that it is supposed to be a Dalmatian) it is usually possible after some time to show to oneself the Dalmatian in the picture – a change in perception that persists afterward so that further presentations of the picture do not necessarily have to be received in the reflective mode.
  7. ↑ The variously expressed criticism of the conception of actual semantic content in images – or signs in general – must also be seen in this context (cf., e.g., [Derrida 1988a]Derrida, Jacques (1988): Signatur Ereignis Kontext. In: Derrida, J. (Hg.), Randgänge der Philosophie. Passagen, Wien.
    ). For the concept of reflective usage, however, it is irrelevant whether such content is considered plausible or not since it is the standard use that is reflected and, if necessary, partially overridden. ⊳ Illocution for the more general critique of the speech act theory.
  8. ↑ It follows, at least historically, from the designation of works of fine art as reflexively used signs that subsequently newly created works are (should be) always viewed with an additional level of reflection: namely as reflexively used signs that are used reflexively in their reflexivity.
Literature
[Boehm 2007a]Boehm, Gottfried (2007): Wie Bilder Sinn erzeugen. Die Macht des Zeigens. Berlin University Press, Berlin.[Derrida 1988a]Derrida, Jacques (1988): Signatur Ereignis Kontext. In: Derrida, J. (Hg.), Randgänge der Philosophie. Passagen, Wien.[Searle 1971a]Searle, John R. (1971): Sprechakttheorie - Ein sprachphilosophischer Essay. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M.

Version 1: 2013

Responsible:

Editing:

Contributions by: Joerg R.J. Schirra und Marcel Lemmes — (Note)

Quote as:

Schirra, Jörg R.J. (2013). Image in reflective use. (Ausg. 1). In: Schirra, J.R.J.; Halawa, M. & Liebsch, D. (Hg.), Glossar der Bildphilosophie. (2012-2026). [bildglossar.org/index.php?title=Glossar-English:Image_in_reflective_use].