Glossar-English:Image Semantics
Main-Item to: Images as Signs
Original: Bildsemantik
The meaning aspect (in the narrower sense) of imagesThe question of image semantics focuses on the relations between image carriers and the entities designated by them, i.e., what is colloquially understood as the meaning of the corresponding image in the narrower sense. It is thus particularly concerned with a possible factual reference of pictorial signs or, in Bühler's terminology of the Organon model, with the aspect of representation.[1] Since meaning phenomena can also occur in pictures on different levels (⊳ Meaning and Reference), a distinction is made between meaning in an intensional sense, the image content, and meaning in an extensional sense, the image reference. In addition, connotations and symbolic uses can contribute to meaning, with both image-syntactic elements (e.g., color) and aspects of primary meaning (e.g., bodies depicted) appearing as symbols of higher-level meanings (e.g., dove for the Holy Spirit). The latter plays a central role, especially for structural images, in which entities or properties that are actually not visible, such as atoms or temperature values, are associated through a metaphorical relationship with visible entities or properties, such as material spheres or color values, and thus become depictable in the first place. ResemblanceThe basis of many image-semantic approaches is a relationship of similarity – possibly metaphorically mediated – between the image (carrier) and what appears to be depicted with it, whereby the image carrier becomes an iconic sign. The image carrier thus shares some, but not all, properties with that entity – obviously, these must be precisely the properties relevant to the syntax of the image. The partial dissimilarities, which Hans Jonas calls „ontological incompleteness“ ([Jonas 1961a]Jonas, Hans (1961): Die Freiheit des Bildens – Homo pictor und die differentia des Menschen. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung, 15. With the focus on similarity, the theoretical view concentrates at the same time primarily on images of sceneries of material-spatial objects. In resemblance theories, the semantics of other types of images, as already indicated above for logical images, must, therefore, be tied back to the image type considered “fundamental” through additional relations if one does not want to deny their pictoriality in general. In ancient image theories,[2] a resemblance relation between two objects is assumed to exist independently of sign use, as it occurs in certain “natural signs” (symptoms; ⊳ “Natural” images): the shadow of a person on a wall, the appearance of a bridge reflected on the water surface.[3] Used as signs, such “ready-made” iconic signs are, according to those theories, the starting point for the purposeful production of images. Obviously, with such an approach, it is quite unproblematic to intent to investigate meaning phenomena independently of the actual sign use. Therefore, semantics seems to determine image pragmatics as well: The representational function triggered by similarity would have to govern all image uses accordingly (⊳ Resemblance and “signs close to perception”). Phenomenological or perception-theoretically oriented image theories[4] take up this primacy of semantics but now shift the focus to a perceived similarity, which can also be socially modified and even constituted purely subjectively. That an object looks similar to a lion is only noticed by someone who is able to distinguish a lion visually. On the other hand, someone who merely falsely believes to know what a lion looks like can nevertheless create a picture that, in their eyes, represents such an animal. In this way, it becomes comprehensible for the resemblance theorists why there can be pictures of fictitious objects at all.[5] These “narrowly conceived” resemblance theories always assume that an image already means something quite definite independent of its concrete use and that this meaning then applies to all (possible) uses of the image (as an image) with only marginal variations due to the respective context. Criticism of the Narrow Similarity SemanticsHowever, those positions have been heavily criticized again and again:[6] Apart from the fact that the similarity relation is symmetrical – if A is similar to B, then also B is similar to A – and therefore could just as well be used as a motivation for a pictorial meaning relation in the opposite direction,[7] only a part of the everyday meaning phenomena of images can be explained with the pure resemblance-mediated representation function in any case. If meanings are understood as aspects of pictorial sign actions, then the semantic considerations, which are conceived in the narrow sense of resemblance theory, narrow the focus of attention to those relations that do not have to be considered as part of the more comprehensive image pragmatics determined by the reference to action – insofar as one can meaningfully speak of such pragmatic-free relations at all. Therefore, sign-theoretical and especially sign-action-theoretical approaches try to relate the similarity relation to the context of sign usage in a different, especially action-theoretical manner, where it is the aspects of sign action that determine the manifestations of the resemblance relation (⊳ Deceptive and immersive modes). With the primacy of pragmatics over semantics thus established, the focus of attention also shifts from “the” meaning of an image to the meanings of different image uses: If the meanings of an image depend essentially on factors of the respective context of use, then it makes no sense at all to speak of a meaning that would exist for the image independently of such a context of use. As an approximation, one could at most speak of it in an image-pragmatic sense, namely as a meaning relative to a socially established (and thus ultimately variable) standard context of use, which would always have to be assumed if no more specific information about the situation of use is known.
About the sub-itemsThe keywords on image semantics can be roughly divided into those more concerned with the essence of the semantic relationship and those that shed more light on the target point of that relation. Obviously, the two complexes should not be considered independently since the nature of the relationship depends on the type of objects related to each other as much as vice versa. The nature of the semantic relationship in imagesHow is the nature of the semantic relationship constituted in pictures in contrast to other kinds of signs? Can one group of characteristic peculiarities of this relationship be determined – or should several different such groups be considered? The different meanings of »image content« and »image reference« have already been pointed out above. The interplay between resemblance and abstraction holds a central role for the nature of the meaning relation in images: How does the similarity score change by varying the degree and types of abstraction, and vice versa? What aspects are taken into account in the similarity assessment at all? Historically as well as systematically, particular attention should be paid here to the role in perspective as both a geometric and a temporal projection, both of which should be placed in relation to the mathematical-abstract property of isomorphism. The possibility of genuine pictorial negation has repeatedly been doubted due to the special weight of a resemblance relation for image semantics,too. For images, this results in very specific relations between the two aspects of the concept »representation«. The target point of the semantic relationship in imagesWhich entities can be denoted by images, and which entities can appear as meaning of images, respectively? Primarily, we are dealing with any visually perceivable entities (⊳ Objects of visual perception). However, especially the sortal objects, as they are called, play a central role, i.e., that kind of material, spatially delimited and temporally extended objects that we colloquially understand as objects in the narrower sense. Insofar as even non-visual phenomena are related initially metaphorically to visuals that are then depicted, the meanings of logical images also depend on these objects individuated in a particular manner. On the other hand, the distinction between reference, denotation, and exemplification primarily determines the semantics of non-figurative images. |
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Literature
[Goodman & Elgin 1988a]Goodman, Nelson & Elgin, Catherine Z. (1988): Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences. Hackett, Indianapolis.[Goodman 1968a]Goodman, Nelson (1968): Languages of Art. Hackett, Indianapolis.[Jonas 1961a]Jonas, Hans (1961): Die Freiheit des Bildens – Homo pictor und die differentia des Menschen. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung, 15.[Plinius 2004a]König, Roderich et al. (Hg.) (1990): G. Plinius Secundus d. Ä: Naturkunde / Naturalis historia: lateinisch-deutsch. Artemis, Zürich.[Ros 1989a]Ros, Arno (1989): “Bedeutung”, “Idee” und “Begriff” – Zur Behandlung einiger bedeutungstheoretischer Paradoxien durch Leibniz. Studia Leibnitiana, 21.[Sachs-Hombach 2003a]Sachs-Hombach, Klaus (2003): Das Bild als kommunikatives Medium. Elemente einer allgemeinen Bildwissenschaft. Halem, Köln.[Scholz 2004a]Scholz, Oliver R. (2004): Bild, Darstellung, Zeichen. Philosophische Theorien bildhafter Darstellungen. Klostermann, Frankfurt/M.[Waldenfels 1999a]Waldenfels, Bernhard (1999): Ordnungen des Sichtbaren. In: Waldenfels, B. (Hg.), Sinnesschwellen. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. Version 1: 2013 Responsible: Seitenbearbeitungen durch: Joerg R.J. Schirra — (Hinweis) Zitierhinweis: |