Glossar-English:Equality, Similarity, and Identity

Sub-Item of: Effects of Pictoriality

Original: Gleichheit, Ähnlichkeit und Identität

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The ambiguity of the expression ‘similarity’ Frequently characterized as ‘the same in the different’, similarity is considered a particularly relevant concept in many image-theoretical approaches if not even a central basic concept (⊳ Similarity and Signs Close to Perception and Symbols, Index, Icon); for a corresponding theory, a being can only be said to use something as an image if it is able to recognize the similarity between objects. On closer inspection, this formulation reveals a rather complex ability, the scope of which only becomes clear in a concept-genetic reconstruction. For, even lower organisms obviously react to similarity, for example, when they are exposed to artificial stimuli in ethological experiments or cases of mimicry in the wild. But it remains questionable whether those creatures actually recognize an occurrence of »similarity«​, well, whether they are even able to recognize a similarity in the meaning actually intended since the expression ‘similarity’ ultimately is used here simply in the sense of ‹equality for those beings›. At the same time, the deviations from equality are only conscious to the human observer. Depending on the context, these are indeed different, albeit related, concepts that can be meant by the same expression ‘similarity’. In particular, the image-theoretical »similarity« (or »resemblance«) concept should be contrasted with the concept of »equality« or »sameness« of objects, on the one hand, and that of »identity« (of occurrences of objects), on the other. This short introduction already makes it clear that the discussion about equality, similarity, and identity does only make sense between the two poles of the assessed objects and their characteristics recognizable to a being, on the one hand, and the judging beings and their competencies to recognize objects, on the other. Only those who are able, for example, to distinguish between the momentary appearance of an object and the object independently of its respective appearance can understand an object as similar to another kind of object, i.e., as ‹equal in its actual appearance to those other objects›. Concept-genetic consideration of​ »similarity«​​ The interlocking of object properties and viewer competencies can best be grasped in an action-theoretical determination of the concept of similarity: The reactions and reaction dispositions that a being shows when an object is present in its environment, then, form the basis of the concept-genetic analysis. Starting point:​ »Similarity«​ as​ »equality«​ The ability to perceive something is probably the indisputable basis from which concept-genetic considerations of the concept of »similarity« can proceed. However, we only recognize that there is a certain perception in another being by its associated reactions. Thus, the anecdote told by Pliny the Younger about the ancient painter Zeuxis suggests at first glance that birds detect similarity: According to Pliny, Zeuxis had made his depiction of grapes so similar that some birds flew over to peck at the apparent fruit (cf. [Pliny 2004a]). The fact that objects are equal in some respects and different in others is only determined relative to the correspondingly equal or different reactions of the being observed (cf. [Gallistel 1980a]Gallistel, Randy (1980): The Organization of Action: A New Synthesis. Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc., Hillsdale, NJ. ). A simple concept of perception arises for beings for whom the environment is already divided into objects though without being able to deal with these objects as individuated objects. On this conceptual level, various near and far stimuli, on the one hand, and different areas of behavior, on the other, are associated with one another, so that one can speak of an object confronting the organism as part of its environment, as well as of its perception: water seen from near and far, heard, felt, etc.; water for drinking, for bathing, for swimming, etc. Nevertheless, it is also true here that appearance and being coincide in each case. To perceive here always means to group things alike. Figure 1: Two types of similarity Referring to the above example of Zeuxis’ birds, which can essentially be understood at the level of complexity mentioned, it is crucial for the action-theoretical definition of the concept of similarity that the behavior of the birds is regarded as behavior that is not adequate for the current behavioral situation (cf. Fig 1). However, as we observers understand, the behavior would fit in quite well with a completely different context – a behavioral situation in which there would, in fact, be food instead of the image carrier. The behavior of the birds shows us, in other words, that false appearances deceive them. It is apparent to the observer that they are wrong. On the other hand, the birds do not see through their behavior as the result of deception. Of course, they will turn away after a while, “disappointed”. However, what remains for them at the place where they had just perceived grapes (B-​perception in Fig. 1) is not something reminiscent of grapes, only something that has nothing to do with grapes at all (A-perception). Whenever such creatures recognize, they react to equality but not to identity since, at this level, the concept of the connection of modes of appearance of the same object that goes beyond one behavioral situation cannot yet be formed. For this very reason, unlike the human observer, they are not able to relate the (deceptive) appearance of a present object to the appearance of a completely different, absent object. Resemblance cannot yet be recognized by beings falling under this concept. Target point:​​ »Similarity«​​ as a counter concept to​​ »identity«​ Unlike birds, humans, with their concepts for individualized objects, in principle, have the option in a trompe l’œil situation, not simply to fall for the deception or not to establish any connection between the image carrier and what is depicted. Instead, they succeed in simultaneously conceiving the representation present (A-perception in Fig. 1, related to the current behavioral situation) and the represented absent (B-perception, related to a different context) and understanding both as two different but related entities. This ability is what we think of as​ »recognizing similarity«​. Thus, in order for creatures to recognize something as similar to something else, two things must be present: The creature must be inclined to react spontaneously to an object in the current context with a behavior that does not suit that object (and thus the current context) but does fit a context with another object; The creature must recognize that there is such a mix-up, so it must be able to establish a connection between the two contexts involved. Since it is colloquially too suggestive and, therefore, hardly avoidable to speak of ‘similarity’ even in the case of Zeuxis' birds and similar cases, it makes sense to distinguish the two cases at least by indices. In [Schirra 2005a]Schirra, Jörg R.J. (2005): Foundation of Computational Visualistics. DUV, Wiesbaden. , for example, the expression ‘similarityα’ is used when attributing a deception to creatures that cannot see through the deception themselves, and ‘similarityβ’ in the sophisticated case. Turned differently, the concept​ »similarityα«​​ is differentiated in the concept-genetic transition into​​ »similarityβ«​,​ on the one hand and​​ »identity«​,​ on the other. While the behaviors of beings that are considered according to the simpler concept of perception are only geared towards objects of the same type (“sameness”), in the case of beings that are judged according to the more complex concept of perception, they are differentiated, on the one hand, into those object-related behaviors with regard to a similar appearance (»similarityβ«) and, on the other hand, object-related behaviors with regard to coherent spatiotemporal development (»identity«). Similarity and context building The basis of the extended perceptual competence that​ »similarityβ«​ allows an agent is equally the basis of the ability of that agent to deal with individual, time-enduring objects (object constitution), namely the ability to relate different situations to each other. Thus, similarity brackets images in two ways with access to absent contexts: Similarity is based on the intentional turning towards an absent situation, which is, thus, constitutive for images as signs close to perception. On the other hand, we use the image to refer to that usually absent situation so that the basic communicative function of the image consists of establishing common access to this context (⊳ Context Building). In image anthropology, this double reference plays an important role in the »initial context formation«​ – the concept-genetic consideration of the ability to deal with absent contexts (⊳ Logical context formation and mental images). See also: Context Context-Building Acts Image Anthropology Logical context-building acts and mental images Resemblance and “signs close to perception” Sign, Sign Carrier, Sign System Sortal objects and individuation Symbol, Index, Icon

Notes Literature [Gallistel 1980a]Gallistel, Randy (1980): The Organization of Action: A New Synthesis. Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc., Hillsdale, NJ.[Goodman 1968a]Goodman, Nelson (1968): Languages of Art. Hackett, Indianapolis.[Schirra & Sachs-Hombach 2006b]Schirra Jörg R.J. & Sachs-Hombach, Klaus (2006): Fähigkeiten zum Bild- und Sprachgebrauch . Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 54, 6.[Schirra 2000a]Schirra, Jörg R.J. (2000): Täuschung, Ähnlichkeit und Immersion: Die Vögel des Zeuxis. In: Rehkämper, K.& Sachs-Hombach, K. (Hg.), Vom Realismus der Bilder: Interdisziplinäre Forschungen zur Semantik bildhafter Darstellungsformen. Skriptum, Magdeburg.[Schirra 2005a]Schirra, Jörg R.J. (2005): Foundation of Computational Visualistics. DUV, Wiesbaden.[Scholz 2004a]Scholz, Oliver R. (2004): Bild, Darstellung, Zeichen. Philosophische Theorien bildhafter Darstellungen. Klostermann, Frankfurt/M.[Wollheim 1982a]Wollheim, Richard (1982): Sehen-als, sehen-in und bildliche Darstellung. In: Wollheim, R. (Hg.), Objekte der Kunst. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. Version 1: 2013 Responsible: Schirra, Jörg R.J. Sachs-Hombach, Klaus Editing: Birk, Elisabeth Contributions by: Joerg R.J. Schirra und Marcel Lemmes — (Note) Quote as: Schirra, Jörg R.J. & Sachs-Hombach, Klaus (2013). Equality, Similarity, and Identity. (Ausg. 1). In: Schirra, J.R.J.; Halawa, M. & Liebsch, D. (Hg.), Glossar der Bildphilosophie. (2012-2026). [bildglossar.org/index.php?title=Glossar-English:Equality,_Similarity,_and_Identity].