Glossar-English:Image Semantics

Main-Item to: Images as Signs

Original: Bildsemantik

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The meaning aspect (in the narrower sense) of images The question of image semantics focuses on the relations between image carriers and the entities designated by them, i.e. what is colloquially understood as the meaning of the corresponding image in the narrower sense. It is thus particularly concerned with a possible factual reference of pictorial signs or, in Bühler's terminology of the Organon model, with the aspect of representation. Since meaning phenomena can also take place in pictures on different levels (⊳ Meaning and Reference), a distinction is made between meaning in an intensional sense, the image content, and meaning in an extensional sense, the image reference. In addition, connotations and symbolic uses can contribute to meaning, with both image-syntactic elements (e.g., color) and aspects of primary meaning (e.g., bodies depicted) appearing as symbols of higher-level meanings (e.g., dove for the Holy Spirit). The latter plays a central role, especially for structural images, in which entities or properties that are actually not visible, such as atoms or temperature values, are associated through a metaphorical relationship with visible entities or properties, such as material spheres or color values, and thus become depictable in the first place. Resemblance The basis of many image-semantic approaches is a relationship of similarity – possibly metaphorically mediated – between the image (carrier) and what appears to be depicted with it, whereby the image carrier becomes an iconic sign. The image carrier thus shares some, but not all, properties with that entity – obviously, these must be precisely the properties relevant to the syntax of the image. The partial dissimilarities, which Hans Jonas calls „ontological incompleteness“ ([Jonas 1961a]Jonas, Hans (1961): Die Freiheit des Bildens – Homo pictor und die differentia des Menschen. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung, 15. Nicht angezeigt: Wieder abgedruckt in: Jonas, Hans: <em>Zwischen Nichts und Ewigkeit – Zur Lehre vom Menschen</em>. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987, 26–43 : p. 29), are also significant in this context: They not only motivate the distinction to replicas but also open the field for stylistic variations. With the focus on similarity, the theoretical view concentrates at the same time primarily on images of sceneries of material-spatial objects. In resemblance theories, the semantics of other types of images, as already indicated above for logical images, must therefore be related back to the image type considered “fundamental” through additional relations if one does not want to deny their pictoriality in general. In ancient image theories, a resemblance relation between two objects is assumed to exist independently of sign use, as it occurs in certain "natural signs" (Anzeichen; ⊳ “Natural” images): the shadow of a person on a wall, the appearance of a bridge reflected on the water surface. Used as signs, such “ready-made” iconic signs are, according to those theories, the starting point for the purposeful production of images. Obviously, with such an approach, it is quite unproblematic to intent to investigate meaning phenomena independently of the actual sign use. Therefore, semantics seems to determine image pragmatics as well: The representational function triggered by similarity would have to govern all image uses accordingly (⊳ Resemblance and “signs close to perception”). [[Phänomenologische Bildtheorien|Phenomenological or perception-theoretically oriented image theories take up this primacy of semantics but now shift the focus to a perceived similarity, which accordingly can also be socially modified and even constituted purely subjectively. That an object looks similar to a lion is only noticed by someone who is able to visually distinguish a lion. On the other hand, someone who merely falsely believes to know what a lion looks like can nevertheless create a picture that in their eyes represents such an animal: In this way, it becomes comprehensible for the resemblance theorists at all why there can be pictures of fictitious objects. These “narrowly conceived” resemblance theories always assume that an image already means something quite definite independent of its concrete use and that this meaning then applies to all (possible) uses of the image (as an image) with only marginal variations due to the respective context. Criticism of the narrow similarity semantics However, those positions have been heavily criticized again and again: Apart from the fact that the similarity relation is symmetrical – if A is similar to B, then also B is similar to A – and therefore could just as well be used as a motivation for a pictorial meaning relation in the opposite direction, only a part of the everyday meaning phenomena of images can be explained with the pure resemblance-mediated representation function anyway. If meanings are understood as aspects of pictorial sign actions, then the semantic considerations, which are conceived in the narrow sense of resemblance theory, narrow the focus of attention to those relations that do not have to be considered as part of the more comprehensive image pragmatics determined by the reference to action – insofar as one can meaningfully speak of such pragmatic-free relations at all. Sign-theoretical and especially sign-action-theoretical approaches therefore try to relate the similarity relation to the context of sign use in a different, especially action-theoretical manner, where it is the aspects of sign action that determine the manifestations of the resemblance relation (⊳ Deceptive and immersive modes). With the primacy of pragmatics over semantics thus established, the focus of attention also shifts from “the” meaning of an image to the meanings of different image uses: If the meanings of an image depend essentially on factors of the respective context of use, then it makes no sense at all to speak of a meaning that would exist for the image independently of such a context of use. As an approximation, one could at most speak of it in an image-pragmatic sense, namely as a meaning relative to a socially established (and thus ultimately variable) standard context of use, which would always have to be assumed if no more specific information about the situation of use is known. About the sub-items The keywords on image semantics can be roughly divided into those that are more concerned with the essence of the semantic relationship and those that shed more light on the target point of that relation. Obviously, the two complexes should not be considered independently since the nature of the relationship depends on the type of objects related to each other as much as vice versa. The nature of the semantic relationship in images How is the nature of the semantic relationship constituted in pictures in contrast to other kinds of signs? Can one group of characteristic peculiarities of this relationship be determined – or should perhaps several different such groups be considered? The different meanings of »image content« and »image reference« have already been pointed out above. A central role for the nature of the meaning relation in images is held by the interplay between resemblance and abstraction: How does the similarity score change by varying the degree and types of abstraction, and vice versa? What aspects are taken into account in the similarity assessment at all? Historically as well as systematically, particular attention should be paid here to the role of perspective as both a geometric and a temporal projection, both of which should be placed in relation to the mathematical-abstract property of isomorphism. It is also due to the special weight of a resemblance relation for image semantics that the possibility of genuine pictorial negation has repeatedly been doubted. For images, this results in very specific relations between the two aspects of the concept »representation«. The target point of the semantic relationship in images Which entities can be denoted by images, respectively which entities can appear as meaning of images? Primarily, we are dealing with any visually perceivable entities (⊳ Objects of visual perception), but especially the sortal objects as they are called play a central role, i.e. that kind of material, spatially delimited and temporally extended objects that we also colloquially understand as objects in the narrower sense. Insofar as even non-visual phenomena are initially metaphorically related to visuals that are then depicted, the semantics of logical images also depend on these objects individuated in a particular manner. For the semantics of non-figurative images, on the other hand, the distinction between reference, denotation, exemplification is primarily determining.

Sub-Items Abstraktion - Ähnlichkeit und wahrnehmungsnahe Zeichen Bild und Negation - Bildinhalt Darstellung und Repräsentation - Isomorphie - Perspektive und Projektion - Referenz, Denotation, Exemplifikation Semantik logischer Bilder - Semantik ungegenständlicher Bilder - sortale Gegenstände und Individuation - Notes Literature [Goodman & Elgin 1988a]Goodman, Nelson & Elgin, Catherine Z. (1988): Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences. Hackett, Indianapolis.[Goodman 1968a]Goodman, Nelson (1968): Languages of Art. Hackett, Indianapolis.[Jonas 1961a]Jonas, Hans (1961): Die Freiheit des Bildens – Homo pictor und die differentia des Menschen. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung, 15.[Plinius 2004a]König, Roderich et al. (Hg.) (1990): G. Plinius Secundus d. Ä: Naturkunde / Naturalis historia: lateinisch-deutsch. Artemis, Zürich.[Ros 1989a]Ros, Arno (1989): “Bedeutung”, “Idee” und “Begriff” – Zur Behandlung einiger bedeutungstheoretischer Paradoxien durch Leibniz. Studia Leibnitiana, 21.[Sachs-Hombach 2003a]Sachs-Hombach, Klaus (2003): Das Bild als kommu­nika­tives Medium. Ele­mente einer allge­meinen Bild­wissen­schaft. Halem, Köln.[Scholz 2004a]Scholz, Oliver R. (2004): Bild, Darstellung, Zeichen. Philosophische Theorien bildhafter Darstellungen. Klostermann, Frankfurt/M.[Waldenfels 1999a]Waldenfels, Bernhard (1999): Ordnungen des Sichtbaren. In: Waldenfels, B. (Hg.), Sinnesschwellen. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. Version 1: 2013 Responsible: Schirra, Jörg R.J. Seitenbearbeitungen durch: Joerg R.J. Schirra — (Hinweis)