Glossar-English:Interaction and Communication: Unterschied zwischen den Versionen

Aus Glossar der Bildphilosophie
Zur Navigation springen Zur Suche springen
Joerg R.J. Schirra (Diskussion | Beiträge)
Keine Bearbeitungszusammenfassung
Joerg R.J. Schirra (Diskussion | Beiträge)
Keine Bearbeitungszusammenfassung
Zeile 19: Zeile 19:
When we look at communication, we look at actions.<ref> See also [[Exkurs:Handlungen|Excursus: Actions]].</ref> Because only those who can perform actions are able to communicate, exchange information, or even thoughts. Actions with several actors involved are also called ''interactions'' (Fig. 1). They often entail interactions in the opposite direction, so that whole chains of interrelated actions can arise. Thus, in a fight between two dogs, each attacking action of one is directed at the other (hence interaction), which immediately reacts to it, for instance with a defensive action, a counterattack, or an action of submission (cf. also <bib id='Mead 1968a'></bib>: p. 81f.). These interactions form a kind of choreography, which resembles turn-based games: For each “move” of one player, there is a usually narrowly limited set of correct subsequent moves of the other, with which the “game” can continue or be regularly terminated (‘language game’; ⊳ [[Illokution|Illocution]]; cf. <bib id='Austin 1972a'></bib> and <bib id='Wittgenstein 1971a'></bib>). If one of the interaction partners does not behave accordingly, they have to expect sanctions, which in the context of communicative action contexts can mean: They have to expect not to be understood, to reap contradiction, or to be asked for further clarifications of their statements.
When we look at communication, we look at actions.<ref> See also [[Exkurs:Handlungen|Excursus: Actions]].</ref> Because only those who can perform actions are able to communicate, exchange information, or even thoughts. Actions with several actors involved are also called ''interactions'' (Fig. 1). They often entail interactions in the opposite direction, so that whole chains of interrelated actions can arise. Thus, in a fight between two dogs, each attacking action of one is directed at the other (hence interaction), which immediately reacts to it, for instance with a defensive action, a counterattack, or an action of submission (cf. also <bib id='Mead 1968a'></bib>: p. 81f.). These interactions form a kind of choreography, which resembles turn-based games: For each “move” of one player, there is a usually narrowly limited set of correct subsequent moves of the other, with which the “game” can continue or be regularly terminated (‘language game’; ⊳ [[Illokution|Illocution]]; cf. <bib id='Austin 1972a'></bib> and <bib id='Wittgenstein 1971a'></bib>). If one of the interaction partners does not behave accordingly, they have to expect sanctions, which in the context of communicative action contexts can mean: They have to expect not to be understood, to reap contradiction, or to be asked for further clarifications of their statements.
:
:
In general, actions are characterized by the fact that they are appropriate. [2] Communication actions have, in very general terms, the primary purpose of coordinating the further actions of the actors involved. This obviously does not already apply to an attacking or defensive action. If one dog jumps at the other's throat or if the latter tries to avoid the other, this cannot (at least not necessarily) be subordinated to the purpose of coordinating the further actions of the two. However, the situation is somewhat different with the act of submission ( which is accordingly also referred to as a gesture of submission): [3 ]This 'lay-on-back-and-defense-throat-presentation' is aimed directly at making it clear to the other dog that further attacks are unnecessary since no more attacks will be attempted. The (successful) submission gesture thus coordinates the further mutual behavior of the dogs.
In general, actions are characterized by the fact that they are purposeful.<ref>Purposefulness is about the fact that we – as observers – recognize a purpose: The respective agents do not have to become aware of this purpose as well. The purposefulness of the action can also be produced, for instance, by evolutionary development processes phylogenetically.</ref> Acts of communication, very generally speaking, have the prominent purpose of coordinating the further actions of the actors involved. This is obviously not already true for an act of attack or defense. If a dog tries to jump at the throat of the other dog or if the latter tries to avoid the first dog, this cannot (at least not necessarily) be subordinated to the purpose of coordinating the further actions of the two dogs. However, it looks somewhat different with the act of submission (which is accordingly also called submission ''gesture''):<ref>In this context, gestures denote simple communicative interactions. They consist especially (but not exclusively) of the beginnings of an underlying non-communicative interaction: A typical example is the snarl of fighting dogs, which originally represents the beginning of a bite attack. However, this attack is no longer executed at all but only hinted at (i.e. used communicatively). The hint is carried out particularly clearly so that the opposite can recognize it as well as possible – that would be clumsy in the case of the real bite attack; the preparatory activity should happen as undetected as possible, in order to make the attack more effective by surprise. Cf. <bib id='Mead 1968a'></bib>.</ref> This ‘laying on the back and presenting the defenseless throat’ is aimed directly at making it clear to the other dog that further attacks are unnecessary since no more attacks are undertaken. The (successful) submission gesture thus coordinates the further mutual behavior of the dogs.


In general, actions are characterized by the fact that they are purposeful.<ref>Purposefulness is about the fact that we – as observers – recognize a purpose: The respective agents do not have to become aware of this purpose as well. The purposefulness of the action can also be produced, for instance, by evolutionary development processes phylogenetically.</ref> Acts of communication, very generally speaking, have the prominent purpose of coordinating the further actions of the actors involved. This is obviously not already true for an act of attack or defense. If a dog tries to jump at the throat of the other dog or if the latter tries to avoid the first dog, this cannot (at least not necessarily) be subordinated to the purpose of coordinating the further actions of the two dogs. However, it looks somewhat different with the act of submission (which is accordingly also called submission ''gesture''):[3]<ref> In this context, gestures denote simple communicative interactions. They consist particularly (but not exclusively) of the beginnings of an underlying non-communicative interaction: a typical example is the snarling of the fighting dogs' teeth, which originally represents the beginning of a bite attack. However, this attack is no longer carried out at all, but only hinted at (ie used for communication). The hint is carried out particularly clearly, ie in such a way that the person opposite can recognize it as well as possible - that would be awkward in the case of a real bite attack, if the preparatory activity should take place as undetected as possible, to make the attack more effective by s
urprise. Lake. [Mead 1968a] .
---
In die&shy;sem Zu&shy;sam&shy;men&shy;hang be&shy;zeich&shy;nen Ges&shy;ten ein&shy;fa&shy;che kom&shy;mu&shy;ni&shy;ka&shy;ti&shy;ve In&shy;ter&shy;ak&shy;tio&shy;nen. Sie be&shy;ste&shy;hen ins&shy;be&shy;son&shy;de&shy;re (aber nicht aus&shy;schließ&shy;lich) aus den An&shy;fän&shy;gen ei&shy;ner zu&shy;grun&shy;de lie&shy;gen&shy;den nicht-kom&shy;mu&shy;ni&shy;ka&shy;ti&shy;ven In&shy;ter&shy;ak&shy;tion: Ty&shy;pi&shy;sches Bei&shy;spiel ist das Zä&shy;hne&shy;flet&shy;schen der käm&shy;pfen&shy;den Hun&shy;de, das ur&shy;sprüng&shy;lich den An&shy;fang ei&shy;ner Biss&shy;at&shy;ta&shy;cke dar&shy;stellt. Die&shy;se At&shy;ta&shy;cke wird aber gar nicht mehr aus&shy;ge&shy;führt, son&shy;dern nur noch an&shy;ge&shy;deu&shy;tet (al&shy;so kom&shy;mu&shy;ni&shy;ka&shy;tiv ge&shy;nutzt). Da&shy;bei wird die An&shy;deu&shy;tung be&shy;son&shy;ders deut&shy;lich aus&shy;ge&shy;führt, al&shy;so so, dass das Ge&shy;gen&shy;über sie mög&shy;lichst gut er&shy;ken&shy;nen kann – das wä&shy;re im Fal&shy;le der ech&shy;ten Biss&shy;at&shy;ta&shy;cke ge&shy;ra&shy;de un&shy;ge&shy;schickt, soll&shy;te die Vor&shy;be&shy;rei&shy;tungs&shy;ak&shy;ti&shy;vi&shy;tät doch da&shy;bei mög&shy;lichst un&shy;ent&shy;deckt ge&shy;sche&shy;hen, um den An&shy;griff durch Über&shy;ra&shy;schung ef&shy;fek&shy;ti&shy;ver zu ma&shy;chen. Vgl. <bib id='Mead 1968a'></bib>.</ref> This 'laying on the back and presenting the defenceless throat' is directly directed to make clear to the other dog that further attacks are unnecessary, since no more attacks are undertaken. The (successful) submission gesture thus coordinates the further mutual behavior of the dogs.


Generell zeichnen sich Hand&shy;lungen dadurch aus, dass sie zweck&shy;mäßig sind. Kommu&shy;nika&shy;tions&shy;handlun&shy;gen haben, sehr all&shy;gemein gefasst, den heraus&shy;gehobe&shy;nen Zweck, das weite&shy;re Han&shy;deln der betei&shy;ligten Handeln&shy;den mitei&shy;nander zu koor&shy;dinieren. Das gilt offen&shy;sicht&shy;lich nicht schon für eine An&shy;griffs- oder Vertei&shy;digungs&shy;handlung. Wenn ein Hund dem anderen an die Gurgel zu springen bzw. dieser jenem auszu&shy;weichen versucht, lässt sich das nicht (jeden&shy;falls nicht not&shy;wendig) dem Zweck unter&shy;ordnen, das weitere Handeln der beiden zu koor&shy;dinieren. Etwas anders sieht es aller&shy;dings bei der Unter&shy;werfungs&shy;handlung aus (die entspre&shy;chend auch als Unter&shy;werfungs&shy;''geste'' bezeich&shy;net wird): Dieses ‹Auf-den-Rü&shy;cken-Legen-und-die-schutz&shy;lose-Kehle-Präsen­&shy;tieren› ist un&shy;mittel&shy;bar darauf gerich&shy;tet, dem anderen Hund klarzu&shy;machen, dass weite&shy;re Angrif&shy;fe unnö&shy;tig sind, da selbst keine An&shy;griffe mehr unter&shy;nommen werden. Die (erfolg&shy;reiche) Unter&shy;werfungs&shy;geste ko&shy;ordi&shy;niert also das weitere gegen&shy;seitige Verhal&shy;ten der Hunde.
==Direct, factual, and communicative interactions==
The example of fighting dogs also makes it clear that not all interactions are already communicative. In particular, a distinction has to be made between the following three cases (cf. <bib id='Ros 2005a'></bib>):


 
# ''Direct interactions'': This involves an individual attempting to physically affect at least one other individual. This may be an act of grooming (“lousing”) or a bite attack during a fight.
==Direkte, sachbezügliche und kommuni&shy;kative Inter&shy;akti&shy;onen==
# ''Factual interactions'': In this case, one being unintentionally familiarizes another being with a certain fact by putting the other being into a situation in which the other being is able to perceive that this and that is the case (showing as ''indication''). Cases of such factual interactions can be found, for example, when one leads by their own drinking the other (e.g. a young animal) to a watering place (i.e. showing the other ‹that one can drink there›).
An dem Beispiel der kämpfenden Hunde wird auch klar, dass nicht alle Inter&shy;aktio&shy;nen bereits kommu&shy;nika&shy;tiv sind. Insbe&shy;sondere ist zu unter&shy;scheiden zwischen den folgen&shy;den drei Fällen (vgl. <bib id='Ros 2005a'></bib>):
# ''Communicative interaction'': This should only be employed in those cases in which an interaction partner tries to present themselves to the other interaction partner in a very specific way as an agent in order to give the other one something to understand (showing as ''ostentation''). This is exactly what happens in the case of the gesture of submission: The submitting one presents themselves as someone who recognizes the dominance of the other one, which they make them understand in exactly this way.
 
# ''Direkte Interaktionen'': Dabei versucht ein Indi&shy;viduum auf min&shy;destens ein weite&shy;res Indi&shy;viduum körper&shy;lich einzu&shy;wirken. Das mag eine Hand&shy;lung der Körper&shy;pflege sein (“Lausen”) oder eine Biss&shy;attacke während eines Kampfes.  
# ''Sachbezügliche Interaktionen'': Dabei macht ein Wesen, ein anderes Wesen mit einem bestimm&shy;ten Sach&shy;verhalt vertraut, indem es den Ande&shy;ren in eine Situa&shy;tion bringt, in der jener selber wahrzu&shy;nehmen in der Lage ist, dass dieses und jenes der Fall ist (Zeigen als ''Indi&shy;kation''). Fälle solcher sachbe&shy;zogenen Inter&shy;aktio&shy;nen finden sich z.B., wenn der Eine den Ande&shy;ren (etwa ein Jung&shy;tier) durch sein eigenes Trin&shy;ken zu einer Wasser&shy;stelle führt (d.h. ihm zeigt, ‹dass man da trinken kann›).
# ''Kommunikative Interaktion'': Hier&shy;von soll erst in den Fällen die Rede sein, in denen sich ein Inter&shy;aktions&shy;partner dem anderen Inter&shy;aktions&shy;partner gegen&shy;über in ganz bestimmter Weise als Handeln&shy;der darzu&shy;stellen versucht, um so dem Gegen&shy;über etwas zu ver&shy;stehen zu geben (Zeigen als ''Osten&shy;tation''). Genau das passiert im Fall der Unter&shy;werfungs&shy;geste: Der sich Unter&shy;werfen&shy;de stellt sich dar als jemand, der die Domi&shy;nanz des Gegen&shy;übers aner&shy;kennt, was er diesem auch genau auf diese Weise zu verstehen gibt.  
:
:
Während es mit einer sachbezüg&shy;lichen Inter&shy;aktion nur mög&shy;lich ist, dem jeweiligen Gegen&shy;über Einsicht in solche Sach&shy;verhal&shy;te zu vermit&shy;teln, die dieses selbst wahr&shy;nehmen kann, können mit&shy;hilfe kommu&shy;nika&shy;tiver Inter&shy;aktio&shy;nen Ein&shy;sichten auch in Sach&shy;verhalte ver&shy;mittelt werden, die vom Gegen&shy;über nicht selber unmit&shy;telbar wahrge&shy;nommen werden: sofern sich nämlich der Sender gegen&shy;über dem Empfän&shy;ger dar&shy;stellen kann als jemand, der sich mit jenem Sach&shy;verhalt konfron&shy;tiert sieht. Das klingt zunächst etwas kompli&shy;ziert, erfasst aber bei&shy;spiels&shy;weise genau die Situa&shy;tion, in der von bestimm&shy;ten Prima&shy;ten spezi&shy;fische Warn&shy;rufe beim Wahr&shy;nehmen von Schlangen oder Greif&shy;vögeln einge&shy;setzt werden. Dabei wird der Schrei nur ausge&shy;stoßen, wenn auch Artge&shy;nossen in der Nähe sind, ihn zu hören. Im Schrei stellt sich der Schreiende den anderen gegen&shy;über dar als jemand, der mit der Gegen&shy;wart einer Schlange (bzw. einem Greif&shy;vogel) konfron&shy;tiert ist. Die Reak&shy;tion auf das Er&shy;scheinen eines solchen Feindes muss jeweils unter&shy;schied&shy;lich sein (bei Schlangen: nicht ins un&shy;über&shy;sicht&shy;liche Gebüsch laufen; bei Greif&shy;vögeln: ins Gebüsch in Deckung gehen). Sie tritt auch bei den Indi&shy;viduen, die nur den Warn&shy;ruf hören, ent&shy;sprechend ein, ganz ohne dass sie selbst die Schlange bzw. den Greif&shy;vogel wahrge&shy;nommen haben müssen. Kommu&shy;nika&shy;tion ist dem&shy;nach, im Unter&shy;schied zur sachbe&shy;zogenen Inter&shy;aktion, immer mit einer ''Selbst&shy;präsen&shy;tation'' des Senders verbunden, der also nicht nur eine Bezie&shy;hung zu dem Empfän&shy;ger auf&shy;bauen, sondern auch in eine bestimmte Rela&shy;tion sich selbst und seinem [[Körper]] gegen&shy;über eintreten muss (⊳ [[Interaktions-, Selbst- und Sachbezug|Inter&shy;aktions-, Selbst- und Sach&shy;bezug]]).  
While it is only possible with a factual interaction to convey to the respective counterpart insight into such facts that the latter can also perceive, with the help of communicative interactions, insights can also be conveyed into states of affairs that are not directly perceived by the counterpart: namely, insofar as the sender can present themselves to the receiver as someone who is confronted with that state of affairs. This sounds a bit complicated at first, but it captures, for example, exactly the situation in which certain primates use specific warning calls when perceiving snakes or birds of prey. The cry is only uttered when conspecifics are nearby to hear it. In the scream, the screamer presents themselves to others as someone confronted with the presence of a snake (or bird of prey, as may be the case). The reaction to the appearance of such an enemy must be different in each case (in the case of snakes: do not run into the obscure bushes; in the case of birds of prey: take cover in the bushes). It also occurs in individuals who only hear the warning call, without having to have noticed the snake or the bird of prey themselves. Communication, in contrast to factual interaction, is thus always connected with a ''self-presentation'' of the sender, who must therefore not only establish a relationship with the receiver but also enter into a certain relationship with themselves and their [[Körper|body]] (⊳ [[Interaktions-, Selbst- und Sachbezug|Interactional, Expressive, and Propositional Angles]]).
:
:
Von ''Zeichenhandlungen'' soll schließ&shy;lich  genau dann die Rede sein, wenn ein Gegen&shy;stand (auch Körper&shy;teil) aus Ein&shy;sicht in die Beson&shy;derhei&shy;ten seiner kommu&shy;nika&shy;tiven Verwen&shy;dungssi&shy;tuation einge&shy;setzt wird, und zwar zu dem vom Handeln&shy;den selbst erkann&shy;ten Zweck der Kommu&shy;nika&shy;tion. Die Zweck&shy;mäßig&shy;keit der Inter&shy;aktion, in der das Zeichen verwendet wird, ist also nicht einfach durch stammes&shy;geschicht&shy;liche Ent&shy;wicklungs&shy;prozesse oder indi&shy;vidual&shy;geschicht&shy;liche Lern&shy;prozesse bestimmt, sondern zum Zweck für den Kommu&shy;nizie&shy;renden selbst geworden.<ref>Kommu&shy;ni&shy;ka&shy;ti&shy;ve In&shy;te&shy;rak&shy;tio&shy;nen, bei de&shy;nen die&shy;se Be&shy;din&shy;gung nicht er&shy;füllt ist, sind Sig&shy;nal&shy;hand&shy;lun&shy;gen. Zu ih&shy;nen ge&shy;hört auch die oben er&shy;wähn&shy;te Un&shy;ter&shy;wer&shy;fungs&shy;ges&shy;te von Hun&shy;den. Vgl. auch [http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kommunikation_%28Biologie%29 Wiki&shy;pedia: Kom&shy;mu&shy;ni&shy;ka&shy;tion (Bio&shy;lo&shy;gie)] sowie <bib id='Bühler 2000a'></bib>: S. 51.<br/>Die Be&shy;deu&shy;tung des Aus&shy;drucks ‘Zei&shy;chen’ wird in ver&shy;schie&shy;de&shy;nen se&shy;mio&shy;ti&shy;schen He&shy;ran&shy;ge&shy;hens&shy;wei&shy;sen un&shy;ter&shy;schied&shy;lich be&shy;stimmt. Mit der um&shy;gangs&shy;sprach&shy;li&shy;chen Ver&shy;wen&shy;dungs&shy;wei&shy;se ver&shy;wandt ist die Be&shy;zeich&shy;nung des zent&shy;ra&shy;len Mit&shy;tel&shy;ge&shy;gen&shy;stands in ei&shy;ner Zei&shy;chen&shy;hand&shy;lung als Zeichen. In hand&shy;lungs&shy;theo&shy;re&shy;ti&shy;schen Se&shy;mi&shy;o&shy;ti&shy;ken wer&shy;den die&shy;se Ge&shy;gen&shy;stän&shy;de hin&shy;ge&shy;gen häu&shy;fig als ‘Mar&shy;ken’ von den ‘Zei&shy;chen’ un&shy;ter&shy;schie&shy;den: Letz&shy;te&shy;re mei&shy;nen dann die je&shy;wei&shy;li&shy;gen Hand&shy;lungs&shy;sche&shy;ma&shy;ta von Zei&shy;chen&shy;hand&shy;lun&shy;gen ins&shy;ge&shy;samt (vgl. <bib id='Kamlah & Lorenzen 1973a'></bib> sowie [[Zeichen, Zeichenträger, Zeichensystem|Zei&shy;chen, Zei&shy;chen&shy;trä&shy;ger, Zei&shy;chen&shy;sys&shy;tem]]).</ref>
Finally, we should speak of ''sign acts'' exactly when an object (also body part) is used out of insight into the peculiarities of its communicative situation of use, and for a communicative purpose recognized by the agent themselves. The purposefulness of the interaction in which the sign is used is, thus, not simply determined by phylogenetic developmental processes or individual-historical learning processes, but has become a purpose for the communicators themselves."<ref>Communicative interactions in which this condition is not met are signal acts. The above-mentioned submission gesture of dogs also belongs to them. Cf. also [http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kommunikation_%28Biologie%29 Wiki&shy;pedia: Kom&shy;mu&shy;ni&shy;ka&shy;tion (Bio&shy;lo&shy;gie)] as well as <bib id='Bühler 2000a'></bib>: p. 51.<br/>
The meaning of the expression ‘sign’ is determined differently in different semiotic approaches. Related to the colloquial usage is the designation of the central middle object in a sign action as a sign. In action-theoretical semiotics, on the other hand, these objects are often distinguished as ‘marks’ from ‘signs’: The latter then mean the respective action schemata of sign actions as a whole (cf. <bib id='Kamlah & Lorenzen 1973a'></bib> as well as [[Zeichen, Zeichenträger, Zeichensystem|Sign, Sign Carrier, Sign System]]).</ref>





Version vom 18. August 2023, 14:02 Uhr

Unterpunkt zu: Zeichentheorien: Übersicht

Original: Interaktion und Kommunikation


What belongs to a sign action?

No object is already a sign by itself. Something becomes a sign only because it is used in a certain way – in a certain social context of action: namely that of communicative interaction. This applies accordingly also to pictures if they are regarded as signs. Communication and interaction, in other words, provide important boundary conditions for the use of images.

Figure 1: Outline for embedding interaction and communication in the hierarchy of action concepts

When we look at communication, we look at actions.[1] Because only those who can perform actions are able to communicate, exchange information, or even thoughts. Actions with several actors involved are also called interactions (Fig. 1). They often entail interactions in the opposite direction, so that whole chains of interrelated actions can arise. Thus, in a fight between two dogs, each attacking action of one is directed at the other (hence interaction), which immediately reacts to it, for instance with a defensive action, a counterattack, or an action of submission (cf. also [Mead 1968a]Mead, George Herbert (1968): Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M.
Nicht angezeigt: Original: <em>Mind, Self, and Society</em>. Hg. v. Charles W. Morris. Chicago, 1934
: p. 81f.). These interactions form a kind of choreography, which resembles turn-based games: For each “move” of one player, there is a usually narrowly limited set of correct subsequent moves of the other, with which the “game” can continue or be regularly terminated (‘language game’; ⊳ Illocution; cf. [Austin 1972a]Austin, John L. (1972): Zur Theorie der Sprechakte. Reclam, Stuttgart.
Nicht angezeigt: orig.: How to do things with Words, 1962
and [Wittgenstein 1971a]Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1971): Philosophische Untersuchungen. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M.
). If one of the interaction partners does not behave accordingly, they have to expect sanctions, which in the context of communicative action contexts can mean: They have to expect not to be understood, to reap contradiction, or to be asked for further clarifications of their statements.

In general, actions are characterized by the fact that they are purposeful.[2] Acts of communication, very generally speaking, have the prominent purpose of coordinating the further actions of the actors involved. This is obviously not already true for an act of attack or defense. If a dog tries to jump at the throat of the other dog or if the latter tries to avoid the first dog, this cannot (at least not necessarily) be subordinated to the purpose of coordinating the further actions of the two dogs. However, it looks somewhat different with the act of submission (which is accordingly also called submission gesture):[3] This ‘laying on the back and presenting the defenseless throat’ is aimed directly at making it clear to the other dog that further attacks are unnecessary since no more attacks are undertaken. The (successful) submission gesture thus coordinates the further mutual behavior of the dogs.


Direct, factual, and communicative interactions

The example of fighting dogs also makes it clear that not all interactions are already communicative. In particular, a distinction has to be made between the following three cases (cf. [Ros 2005a]Ros, Arno (2005): Materie und Geist. Eine philosophische Untersuchung. Mentis, Paderborn.
):

  1. Direct interactions: This involves an individual attempting to physically affect at least one other individual. This may be an act of grooming (“lousing”) or a bite attack during a fight.
  2. Factual interactions: In this case, one being unintentionally familiarizes another being with a certain fact by putting the other being into a situation in which the other being is able to perceive that this and that is the case (showing as indication). Cases of such factual interactions can be found, for example, when one leads by their own drinking the other (e.g. a young animal) to a watering place (i.e. showing the other ‹that one can drink there›).
  3. Communicative interaction: This should only be employed in those cases in which an interaction partner tries to present themselves to the other interaction partner in a very specific way as an agent in order to give the other one something to understand (showing as ostentation). This is exactly what happens in the case of the gesture of submission: The submitting one presents themselves as someone who recognizes the dominance of the other one, which they make them understand in exactly this way.

While it is only possible with a factual interaction to convey to the respective counterpart insight into such facts that the latter can also perceive, with the help of communicative interactions, insights can also be conveyed into states of affairs that are not directly perceived by the counterpart: namely, insofar as the sender can present themselves to the receiver as someone who is confronted with that state of affairs. This sounds a bit complicated at first, but it captures, for example, exactly the situation in which certain primates use specific warning calls when perceiving snakes or birds of prey. The cry is only uttered when conspecifics are nearby to hear it. In the scream, the screamer presents themselves to others as someone confronted with the presence of a snake (or bird of prey, as may be the case). The reaction to the appearance of such an enemy must be different in each case (in the case of snakes: do not run into the obscure bushes; in the case of birds of prey: take cover in the bushes). It also occurs in individuals who only hear the warning call, without having to have noticed the snake or the bird of prey themselves. Communication, in contrast to factual interaction, is thus always connected with a self-presentation of the sender, who must therefore not only establish a relationship with the receiver but also enter into a certain relationship with themselves and their body (⊳ Interactional, Expressive, and Propositional Angles).

Finally, we should speak of sign acts exactly when an object (also body part) is used out of insight into the peculiarities of its communicative situation of use, and for a communicative purpose recognized by the agent themselves. The purposefulness of the interaction in which the sign is used is, thus, not simply determined by phylogenetic developmental processes or individual-historical learning processes, but has become a purpose for the communicators themselves."[4]


Bildgebrauch als Interaktion und als Kom­mu­ni­ka­tion

Ab­bil­dung 2: Bild­prä­sen­ta­tion als sach­be­züg­li­che In­ter­ak­tion? (John Pugh: «Art im­it­at­ing life im­it­at­ing art im­it­at­ing life», Wand­bild mit rah­men­den Wand­tei­len)

Anhand eines trompe l'œils mag es zu­nächst er­schei­nen, als könn­ten Bil­der auch le­dig­lich als sach­be­züg­li­che In­ter­ak­tio­nen wir­ken (sie­he Abb. 2): Denn der Ma­ler des ab­ge­bil­de­ten trom­pe l'œils er­mög­licht es mit der be­mal­ten Flä­che ja of­fen­bar, dass sei­ne Ad­res­sa­ten be­stimm­te Sach­ver­hal­te selbst se­hen kön­nen: Er zeigt ih­nen (im Sin­ne von In­di­ka­tion) ei­nen Raum, in dem un­ter vie­lem an­de­ren zwei Bis­tro-Ti­sche ste­hen, von de­nen ei­ner ei­ner jun­gen, dun­kel­haa­ri­gen, schwarz ge­klei­de­ten Frau, die ganz in sich ver­sun­ken liest, als Arm­stüt­ze dient. Die vi­su­el­le Er­fah­rung scheint ganz un­mit­tel­bar ge­ge­ben (⊳ auch Evi­denz, vi­su­el­le/iko­ni­sche).

Doch vernachlässigt eine solche Betrach­tungs­weise den Zeichen­charak­ter des Bildes, da dann ein­fach eine Verwechs­lung vorliegt, das Bild also für das Abge­bildete genom­men wird. Genau das aber tun Bild­nutzer in der Regel beim Bildge­brauch nicht. Viel­mehr ist ihnen der Unter­schied zwischen Bild­träger und Darge­stelltem jeweils (zumindest bis zu einem gewis­sen Grade) bewusst (⊳ dezep­tiver und immer­siver Modus). Auch der Zweck, den sie damit verbin­den, das Bild jeman­dem zu präsen­tieren, ist ihnen in der Regel selbst bewusst.

Versteht man den Bildge­brauch als kommu­nika­tive Inter­aktion, ergibt sich unmit­telbar die folgen­de Frage: Wie stellt sich der Bild­nutzer qua Bildge­brauch dem Kommu­nika­tions­partner gegen­über dar (⊳ Inter­aktions-, Selbst- und Sach­bezug) und wer ist im Zweifels­fall der Kommu­nika­tions­partner, wenn etwa einer allein ein Bild betrach­tet (⊳ Bild­rezep­tion als Kommu­nika­tions­prozess)?


Auswirkungen auf andere Begriffe

Die Handlungsaspekte des Bildge­brauchs werden im Rahmen der Bildpragmatik verhandelt. Dort finden sich auch weitere Gesichts­punkte des Bild­handelns. Dazu zählen insbe­sondere die Bezie­hung zwischen Affekt und Kommu­nika­tion und das Verständnis von Bild­rezep­tion als Kommu­nika­tions­prozess. Die enge Bezie­hung von Zeichen- und Medien­begriff spiegelt sich zudem im Schlag­wort Kommu­nika­tions­medien wider.[5]

Notes
  1. ↑ See also Excursus: Actions.
  2. ↑ Purposefulness is about the fact that we – as observers – recognize a purpose: The respective agents do not have to become aware of this purpose as well. The purposefulness of the action can also be produced, for instance, by evolutionary development processes phylogenetically.
  3. ↑ In this context, gestures denote simple communicative interactions. They consist especially (but not exclusively) of the beginnings of an underlying non-communicative interaction: A typical example is the snarl of fighting dogs, which originally represents the beginning of a bite attack. However, this attack is no longer executed at all but only hinted at (i.e. used communicatively). The hint is carried out particularly clearly so that the opposite can recognize it as well as possible – that would be clumsy in the case of the real bite attack; the preparatory activity should happen as undetected as possible, in order to make the attack more effective by surprise. Cf. [Mead 1968a]Mead, George Herbert (1968): Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M.
    Nicht angezeigt: Original: <em>Mind, Self, and Society</em>. Hg. v. Charles W. Morris. Chicago, 1934
    .
  4. ↑ Communicative interactions in which this condition is not met are signal acts. The above-mentioned submission gesture of dogs also belongs to them. Cf. also Wiki­pedia: Kom­mu­ni­ka­tion (Bio­lo­gie) as well as [Bühler 2000a]Bühler, Karl (2000): Die Krise der Psychologie. Velbrück, Weilerswist.
    Notiz: (orig.: 1927)
    Nicht angezeigt: hrsg. von Eschbach, A. & Kapitzky, J.
    : p. 51.
    The meaning of the expression ‘sign’ is determined differently in different semiotic approaches. Related to the colloquial usage is the designation of the central middle object in a sign action as a sign. In action-theoretical semiotics, on the other hand, these objects are often distinguished as ‘marks’ from ‘signs’: The latter then mean the respective action schemata of sign actions as a whole (cf. [Kamlah & Lorenzen 1973a]Kamlah, Wilhelm & Lorenzen, Paul (1973): Logische Propädeutik. Vorschule des vernünftigen Redens. BI Wissenschaftsverlag, München.
    Nicht angezeigt: 2. Aufl. (<sup>1</sup>1967, <sup>3</sup>1996)
    as well as Sign, Sign Carrier, Sign System).
  5. ↑ Vgl. auch die Wi­ki­pe­dia-Ein­trä­ge zu In­ter­ak­tion, Kom­mu­ni­ka­tion und Kom­mu­ni­ka­tion­smo­dell.
Literature
[Austin 1972a]Austin, John L. (1972): Zur Theorie der Sprechakte. Reclam, Stuttgart.[Bühler 2000a]Bühler, Karl (2000): Die Krise der Psychologie. Velbrück, Weilerswist.[Kamlah & Lorenzen 1973a]Kamlah, Wilhelm & Lorenzen, Paul (1973): Logische Propädeutik. Vorschule des vernünftigen Redens. BI Wissenschaftsverlag, München.[Mead 1968a]Mead, George Herbert (1968): Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M.[Ros 2005a]Ros, Arno (2005): Materie und Geist. Eine philosophische Untersuchung. Mentis, Paderborn.[Wittgenstein 1971a]Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1971): Philosophische Untersuchungen. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M.

Version 1: 2013

Responsible:

Editing:

Contributions by: Joerg R.J. Schirra und Marcel Lemmes — (Note)

Quote as:

[Schirra 2013g-l]Schirra, Jörg R.J. (2013). Interaktion und Kommunikation. (Ausg. 1). In: Schirra, J.R.J.; Halawa, M. & Liebsch, D. (Hg.), Glossar der Bildphilosophie. (2012-2026). [bildglossar.org/index.php?title=Interaktion_und_Kommunikation].
Webadresse: bildglossar.org/index.php?title=Interaktion_und_Kommunikation

Schirra, Jörg R.J. (2013). Interaction and Communication. (Ausg. 1). In: Schirra, J.R.J.; Halawa, M. & Liebsch, D. (Hg.), Glossar der Bildphilosophie. (2012-2026). [bildglossar.org/index.php?title=Glossar-English:Interaction_and_Communication].