Glossar-English:Effects of Pictoriality: Unterschied zwischen den Versionen
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The concept-genetic consideration is based on using the composition of a questionable conceptual field from simpler, jointly already established conceptual fields as a suggestion to show a skeptical counterpart a rational way to adopt the questionable conceptual field: Namely, that the reference points we use to communicate about common divisions of the world can be extended by certain combinations in such a way that, with the concepts thus obtained, an interesting group of phenomena can be ''conceived of'' as systematically connected in the first place. | The concept-genetic consideration is based on using the composition of a questionable conceptual field from simpler, jointly already established conceptual fields as a suggestion to show a skeptical counterpart a rational way to adopt the questionable conceptual field: Namely, that the reference points we use to communicate about common divisions of the world can be extended by certain combinations in such a way that, with the concepts thus obtained, an interesting group of phenomena can be ''conceived of'' as systematically connected in the first place. | ||
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A | A concept-genetic reconstruction of an introductory situation of the image concept may, for example, refer to different developmental stages of [[Glossar-English:Sign, Sign Carrier, Sign System|sign behavior]] or, more precisely: to a sequence of conceptual fields that allow us to conceive of something in the world as a being with sign behavior of a certain degree of complexity – that is, as something that is capable of behaving in a certain more or less complex way simultaneously to itself, its conspecifics, and its environment. It may play a role in one of the transitions, for instance, that beings of the level just considered sometimes include an actually erroneous perception of their environment in one of their sign acts. If such behavior is seen not only as a contingent coincidence of two intrinsically independent behavioral instances but as an indication of a possible systematic combination of behaviors, a bridge is built for a correspondingly combined notion of a more complex type of behavior. | ||
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However, the agent of such behavior is then not simply a being of the same kind as the beings considered before: As a result of the systematic interrelations of concepts in a conceptual field, such a conceptual combination also changes the concept of the entity that is capable of that kind of more complex behavior (<bib id='Ros 1979a'></bib>). | However, the agent of such behavior is then not simply a being of the same kind as the beings considered before: As a result of the systematic interrelations of concepts in a conceptual field, such a conceptual combination also changes the concept of the entity that is capable of that kind of more complex behavior (<bib id='Ros 1979a'></bib>). | ||
== | ==Types of effects of concept synthesis== | ||
In addition to the central concept here – the concept of image competence – a concept-genetic constitution may also determine a whole series of other concepts that at first do not seem to be readily related to it but which nevertheless belong to the same conceptual field. But these are not the only | |||
=== | ===Other concepts from the same conceptual field=== | ||
These “side-effects” of conceptual synthesis concern not only the actual bearer of image competence, negotiated here under the heading ‘[[homo pictor]]’, but above all the concepts of [[Ähnlichkeit|resemblance]] and propositional [[Glossar-English:Sign, Sign Carrier, Sign System#Verbal signs|language]], considered here under the heading ‘[[dezeptiver und immersiver Modus|deceptive and immersive mode]]’. | |||
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Also affected is the [[sortale Gegenstände und Individuation|concept of objects in the narrower sense]], which, at least for an important subclass of images, provides exactly the [[Bildinhalt|image content]], as well as the ability to free oneself from the respective [[Glossar-English:Context|here and now]] and thus to be able to enter (in Plessner's words) into an ''eccentric'' relation to oneself and one's environment (<bib id='Plessner 1928a'>Pless­ner 1928a</bib>). Often, these concepts emerge as one branch of a differentiation of a competence already present in beings not capable of image use. Such a differentiation of basic concepts concerns, in particular, the relation of [[Glossar-English:Equality, Similarity, and Identity|equality, similarity, and identity]]. | |||
=== | ===Elementary image concepts and image concepts of a higher order=== | ||
Another consequence of a concept-genetic consideration of pictoriality understood as image competence is that further, more complex levels can be built (via continued concept-genetic reconstructions) on the elementary concept of pictoriality thus obtained. Between which levels of the [[Bildhaftes|pictorial]] would we have to differentiate? Candidates for higher-level image concepts are, for instance, [[Strukturbild|structural images]], [[Glossar-English:Image in reflective use|reflexively used images]], but also of [[Film|moving]] or [[interaktives Bild|interactive images]]. Is there even a single elementary image function? | |||
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The answer to the question of the actual elementary image function, which ultimately underlies every single image use,<ref>See in this context especially [[Glossar-English:Predication|predication]], [[Glossar-English:Nomination|nomination]], [[Glossar-English:Proposition|proposition]] and [[Glossar-English:Context-Building Acts|context-building acts]])</ref> can thereby be motivated via the concept-genetic relations: The usages that are possible according to the simplest conceptual field reconstructed concept-genetically for beings to whom image competence is rightly attributed will also underlie all higher-level image concepts in a more or less differentiated form. | |||
===Partielle Strukturübertragung auf andere Begriffs­felder=== | ===Partielle Strukturübertragung auf andere Begriffs­felder=== | ||
Version vom 7. September 2023, 19:10 Uhr
Main-Item to: Pictoriality: Conditions and Consequences
Original: Auswirkungen der Bildlichkeit
Image competence in concept-genetic considerationsThe pictorial quality of an object and, thus, the image competence of the person who deals with that part of their environment (the object) as an image is not a property that can simply be regarded as additively placed next to others. It is interrelated with other properties or competencies in multiple ways, and its conceptual constitution consequently affects the concepts we should make of them. These effects are now the focus. The concept-genetic consideration is based on using the composition of a questionable conceptual field from simpler, jointly already established conceptual fields as a suggestion to show a skeptical counterpart a rational way to adopt the questionable conceptual field: Namely, that the reference points we use to communicate about common divisions of the world can be extended by certain combinations in such a way that, with the concepts thus obtained, an interesting group of phenomena can be conceived of as systematically connected in the first place. A concept-genetic reconstruction of an introductory situation of the image concept may, for example, refer to different developmental stages of sign behavior or, more precisely: to a sequence of conceptual fields that allow us to conceive of something in the world as a being with sign behavior of a certain degree of complexity – that is, as something that is capable of behaving in a certain more or less complex way simultaneously to itself, its conspecifics, and its environment. It may play a role in one of the transitions, for instance, that beings of the level just considered sometimes include an actually erroneous perception of their environment in one of their sign acts. If such behavior is seen not only as a contingent coincidence of two intrinsically independent behavioral instances but as an indication of a possible systematic combination of behaviors, a bridge is built for a correspondingly combined notion of a more complex type of behavior. However, the agent of such behavior is then not simply a being of the same kind as the beings considered before: As a result of the systematic interrelations of concepts in a conceptual field, such a conceptual combination also changes the concept of the entity that is capable of that kind of more complex behavior ([Ros 1979a]Ros, Arno (1979): Objektkonstitution und elementare Sprachhandlungsbegriffe. Hain, Königstein/Ts.
Types of effects of concept synthesisIn addition to the central concept here – the concept of image competence – a concept-genetic constitution may also determine a whole series of other concepts that at first do not seem to be readily related to it but which nevertheless belong to the same conceptual field. But these are not the only Other concepts from the same conceptual fieldThese “side-effects” of conceptual synthesis concern not only the actual bearer of image competence, negotiated here under the heading ‘homo pictor’, but above all the concepts of resemblance and propositional language, considered here under the heading ‘deceptive and immersive mode’. Also affected is the concept of objects in the narrower sense, which, at least for an important subclass of images, provides exactly the image content, as well as the ability to free oneself from the respective here and now and thus to be able to enter (in Plessner's words) into an eccentric relation to oneself and one's environment ([Plessner 1928a]Plessner, Helmuth (1928): Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch. W. de Gruyter, Berlin. Elementary image concepts and image concepts of a higher orderAnother consequence of a concept-genetic consideration of pictoriality understood as image competence is that further, more complex levels can be built (via continued concept-genetic reconstructions) on the elementary concept of pictoriality thus obtained. Between which levels of the pictorial would we have to differentiate? Candidates for higher-level image concepts are, for instance, structural images, reflexively used images, but also of moving or interactive images. Is there even a single elementary image function? The answer to the question of the actual elementary image function, which ultimately underlies every single image use,[1] can thereby be motivated via the concept-genetic relations: The usages that are possible according to the simplest conceptual field reconstructed concept-genetically for beings to whom image competence is rightly attributed will also underlie all higher-level image concepts in a more or less differentiated form. Partielle Strukturübertragung auf andere BegriffsfelderOb Begriffe wie der der Anschauung, der des Vorstellungsbildes oder der der Bildvorstellung ebenfalls als höherstufige Bildbegriffe zu verstehen sind, sei hier dahingestellt. Sehr gut möglich wäre auch, dass es sich dabei um eine Folge der Begriffssynthese des Bildbegriffs ganz anderer Art handelt: einer partiellen Strukturübertragung nämlich auf Begriffsfelder für ganz andere Phänomenbereiche, d.h.: eine Metapher im Sinn der Kognitiven Linguistik ([Lakoff 1987a]Lakoff, George (1987): Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things – What Categories Reveal about the Mind. Chicago University Press, Chicago. Wer eine Metapher als ein Sprach“bild” bezeichnet wird meist doch zugestehen, dass damit keineswegs ein Bild im üblichen Sinn gemeint ist: vielmehr wird der Ausdruck gemeinhin selbst als ein “Sprachbild” verstanden. Allerdings ist die Bezeichnung dabei auch nicht rein zufällig äquivok, wie es etwa bei ‘Bank’ als Gartenmöbel und als Finanzinstitut der Fall ist. Vielmehr ist die Ähnlichkeit des Ausdrucks durch bestimmte Ähnlichkeiten in der Erscheinungsweise der beiden betrachteten Phänomenbereiche – bzw. genauer: unserer Argumentationen zu den Bereichen motiviert. Dass ein Teil der begrifflichen Struktur, also der Argumente stiftenden Zusammenhänge zwischen eng verbundenen Begriffen eines unserer Begriffsfelder, in einer mehr oder weniger weiten, aber stets unvollständigen Isomorphie-Beziehung mit der begrifflichen Struktur eines ganz anderen von uns verwendeten Begriffsfeldes steht ermöglicht uns, über die Phänomene, die unter ersteres fallen, in gewissen Grenzen so zu reden und so zu argumentieren, als würde es um Phänomene unter dem zweiten Begriffsfeld gehen. Es handelt sich also um Phänomene, die wir als uneigentliche Bilder auffassen können, sofern nur der Bildbegriff verfügbar ist. So kann beispielsweise von ‘Lebensform’ als ‘Weltbild’ nur dann die Rede sein, wenn der Begriff der Lebensform als partiell strukturgleich zu dem des betrachteten Bildbegriffs verstanden wird: Man kann aber auch ganz ohne Verwendung des Bildbegriffs über dasselbe Phänomen reden, sofern nicht behauptet werden soll, es würde sich dabei tatsächlich um eine echte Art von Bild handeln. Ob und in welchem Sinn schließlich mit dem Ausdruck ‘mentales Bild’ eine Metapher artikuliert wird ist Thema des Unterpunkts logische Kontextbildung und mentale Bilder, der zugleich zur Diskussion der Auswirkungen der begriffsgenetischen Betrachtungen der Bildlichkeit auf die Begriffe der Ähnlichkeit und der Sprache zurückverweist. |
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Literature
[Lakoff 1987a]Lakoff, George (1987): Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things – What Categories Reveal about the Mind. Chicago University Press, Chicago.[Plessner 1928a]Plessner, Helmuth (1928): Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch. W. de Gruyter, Berlin.[Ros 1979a]Ros, Arno (1979): Objektkonstitution und elementare Sprachhandlungsbegriffe. Hain, Königstein/Ts. Version 1: 2013 Responsible: Seitenbearbeitungen durch: Joerg R.J. Schirra — (Hinweis) |