Glossar-English:Effects of Pictoriality: Unterschied zwischen den Versionen

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Joerg R.J. Schirra (Diskussion | Beiträge)
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The concept-genetic consideration is based on using the composition of a questionable conceptual field from simpler, jointly already established conceptual fields as a suggestion to show a skeptical counterpart a rational way to adopt the questionable conceptual field: Namely, that the reference points we use to communicate about common divisions of the world can be extended by certain combinations in such a way that, with the concepts thus obtained, an interesting group of phenomena can be ''conceived of'' as systematically connected in the first place.
The concept-genetic consideration is based on using the composition of a questionable conceptual field from simpler, jointly already established conceptual fields as a suggestion to show a skeptical counterpart a rational way to adopt the questionable conceptual field: Namely, that the reference points we use to communicate about common divisions of the world can be extended by certain combinations in such a way that, with the concepts thus obtained, an interesting group of phenomena can be ''conceived of'' as systematically connected in the first place.
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A conceptual-genetic reconstruction of an introductory situation of the image concept may, for example, refer to different developmental stages of [[Glossar-English:Sign, Sign Carrier, Sign System|sign behavior]] or, more precisely: to a sequence of conceptual fields that allow us to conceive of something in the world as a being with sign behavior of a certain degree of complexity – that is, as something that is capable of behaving in a certain more or less complex way simultaneously to itself, its conspecifics, and its environment. It may play a role in one of the transitions, for instance, that beings of the level just considered sometimes include an actually erroneous perception of their environment in one of their sign acts. If such behavior is seen not only as a contingent coincidence of two intrinsically independent behavioral instances but as an indication of a possible systematic combination of behaviors, a bridge is built for a correspondingly combined notion of a more complex type of behavior.
A concept-genetic reconstruction of an introductory situation of the image concept may, for example, refer to different developmental stages of [[Glossar-English:Sign, Sign Carrier, Sign System|sign behavior]] or, more precisely: to a sequence of conceptual fields that allow us to conceive of something in the world as a being with sign behavior of a certain degree of complexity – that is, as something that is capable of behaving in a certain more or less complex way simultaneously to itself, its conspecifics, and its environment. It may play a role in one of the transitions, for instance, that beings of the level just considered sometimes include an actually erroneous perception of their environment in one of their sign acts. If such behavior is seen not only as a contingent coincidence of two intrinsically independent behavioral instances but as an indication of a possible systematic combination of behaviors, a bridge is built for a correspondingly combined notion of a more complex type of behavior.
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However, the agent of such behavior is then not simply a being of the same kind as the beings considered before: As a result of the systematic interrelations of concepts in a conceptual field, such a conceptual combination also changes the concept of the entity that is capable of that kind of more complex behavior (<bib id='Ros 1979a'></bib>).
However, the agent of such behavior is then not simply a being of the same kind as the beings considered before: As a result of the systematic interrelations of concepts in a conceptual field, such a conceptual combination also changes the concept of the entity that is capable of that kind of more complex behavior (<bib id='Ros 1979a'></bib>).




==Arten von Auswirkungen der Begriffs&shy;synthese==
==Types of effects of concept synthesis==


Neben dem hier zentralen Begriff – dem Begriff der Bildkom&shy;petenz – deter&shy;miniert eine begriffs&shy;gene&shy;tische Konsti&shy;tution also unter Umstän&shy;den auch eine ganze Reihe ande&shy;rer Begrif&shy;fe, die zunächst nicht ohne Weite&shy;res mit jenem in Zusam&shy;menhang zu stehen scheinen, aber trotz&shy;dem zum gleichen Begriffs&shy;feld gehö&shy;ren. Doch sind das nicht die einzigen Auswir&shy;kungen.
In addition to the central concept here – the concept of image competence – a concept-genetic constitution may also determine a whole series of other concepts that at first do not seem to be readily related to it but which nevertheless belong to the same conceptual field. But these are not the only


===Weitere Begriffe desselben Begriffs&shy;feldes===
===Other concepts from the same conceptual field===
Diese “Nebenwirkungen” der Begriffs&shy;synthe&shy;se betref&shy;fen neben dem eigent&shy;lichen Träger der Bildkom&shy;petenz, der hier unter der Überschrift ‘[[homo pictor]]’ verhan&shy;delt wird, vor allem die Begrif&shy;fe der [[Ähnlichkeit|Ähnlich&shy;keit]] und der sachbe&shy;zoge&shy;nen [[Zeichen, Zeichenträger, Zeichensystem#Sprachliche Zeichen|Sprache]], die hier unter der Bezeich&shy;nung ‘[[dezeptiver und immersiver Modus|dezep&shy;tiver und immer&shy;siver Modus]]’ betrach&shy;tet werden.  
 
These “side-effects” of conceptual synthesis concern not only the actual bearer of image competence, negotiated here under the heading ‘[[homo pictor]]’, but above all the concepts of [[Ähnlichkeit|resemblance]] and propositional [[Glossar-English:Sign, Sign Carrier, Sign System#Verbal signs|language]], considered here under the heading ‘[[dezeptiver und immersiver Modus|deceptive and immersive mode]]’.
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Betroffen ist aber auch der [[sortale Gegenstände und Individuation|Begriff der Gegen&shy;stände im enge&shy;ren Sinn]], die zumin&shy;dest für eine wichti&shy;ge Teilklas&shy;se von Bildern genau den [[Bildinhalt|Bildin&shy;halt]] liefern, sowie der Fähig&shy;keit, sich aus dem jewei&shy;ligen [[Kontext|Hier und Jetzt]] zu befrei&shy;en und damit in ein (mit Pless&shy;ners Worten) ''exzen&shy;trisches'' Verhält&shy;nis zu sich selbst und seiner Umwelt treten zu können (<bib id='Plessner 1928a'>Pless&shy;ner 1928a</bib>). Oft treten diese Begrif&shy;fe als der eine Ast einer Diffe&shy;renzie&shy;rung einer bereits bei nicht-bildfä&shy;higen Wesen vorhan&shy;denen Kompe&shy;tenz zuta&shy;ge. Eine solche Ausdif&shy;feren&shy;zierung von Grundbe&shy;griffen betrifft insbe&shy;sonde&shy;re das Verhält&shy;nis von [[Gleichheit, Ähnlichkeit und Identität|Gleich&shy;heit, Ähnlich&shy;keit und Iden&shy;tität]].  
Also affected is the [[sortale Gegenstände und Individuation|concept of objects in the narrower sense]], which, at least for an important subclass of images, provides exactly the [[Bildinhalt|image content]], as well as the ability to free oneself from the respective [[Glossar-English:Context|here and now]] and thus to be able to enter (in Plessner's words) into an ''eccentric'' relation to oneself and one's environment (<bib id='Plessner 1928a'>Pless&shy;ner 1928a</bib>). Often, these concepts emerge as one branch of a differentiation of a competence already present in beings not capable of image use. Such a differentiation of basic concepts concerns, in particular, the relation of [[Glossar-English:Equality, Similarity, and Identity|equality, similarity, and identity]].


===Elementare Bildbegriffe und Bildbe&shy;griffe höhe&shy;rer Ordnung===
===Elementary image concepts and image concepts of a higher order===
Eine weitere Folge einer begriffs&shy;gene&shy;tischen Betrach&shy;tung der als Bildkom&shy;petenz verstan&shy;denen Bildlich&shy;keit besteht darin, dass auf dem so gewon&shy;nenen ele&shy;menta&shy;ren Bildbe&shy;griff weite&shy;re, komple&shy;xere Stufen (über fortge&shy;setzte begriffs&shy;gene&shy;tische Rekon&shy;struktio&shy;nen) aufge&shy;baut werden können. Zwischen welchen Stufen des [[Bildhaftes|Bildhaf&shy;ten]] wäre also zu diffe&shy;renzie&shy;ren? Kandi&shy;daten für höher&shy;stufi&shy;ge Bildbe&shy;griffe sind etwa der des [[Strukturbild|Struktur&shy;bildes]], des [[Bild in reflexiver Verwendung|refle&shy;xiv verwen&shy;deten Bildes]], aber auch des [[Film|beweg&shy;ten]] oder [[interaktives Bild|inter&shy;akti&shy;ven Bildes]]. Gibt es über&shy;haupt eine einzi&shy;ge ele&shy;menta&shy;re Bildfunk&shy;tion?
Another consequence of a concept-genetic consideration of pictoriality understood as image competence is that further, more complex levels can be built (via continued concept-genetic reconstructions) on the elementary concept of pictoriality thus obtained. Between which levels of the [[Bildhaftes|pictorial]] would we have to differentiate? Candidates for higher-level image concepts are, for instance, [[Strukturbild|structural images]], [[Glossar-English:Image in reflective use|reflexively used images]], but also of [[Film|moving]] or [[interaktives Bild|interactive images]]. Is there even a single elementary image function?
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Die Antwort auf die Frage nach der eigent&shy;lichen ele&shy;menta&shy;ren Bildfunk&shy;tion, die jedem einzel&shy;nen Bildge&shy;brauch letzt&shy;lich zugrun&shy;de liegt (siehe hierzu vor allem unter [[Prädikation|Prädi&shy;kation]], [[Nomination|Nomi&shy;nation]], [[Proposition|Propo&shy;sition]] und [[Kontextbildung|Kontext&shy;bildung]]), kann dabei über die begriffs&shy;gene&shy;tischen Rela&shy;tionen moti&shy;viert werden: Die Verwen&shy;dungswei&shy;sen, die gemäß dem am einfach&shy;sten begriffs&shy;gene&shy;tisch zu rekon&shy;struie&shy;renden Begriffs&shy;feld für Wesen, denen zurecht Bildkom&shy;petenz zuge&shy;schrieben wird, möglich sind, werden in mehr oder weniger ausdif&shy;feren&shy;zierter Form auch allen höher&shy;stufi&shy;gen Bildbe&shy;griffen zugrun&shy;de liegen.<!--<ref>Es mag durchaus möglich sein, dass ein Spezialfall begriffsgenetisch vor dem allgemeineren Fall auftritt (gegenständlich darstellende Bilder als der Spezialfall von Strukturbildern, bei dem die metaphorische Projektion zwischen eigentlicher inhaltlicher Domäne und visualisierter Domäne zur Identitätsabbildung entartet).</ref> -->
The answer to the question of the actual elementary image function, which ultimately underlies every single image use,<ref>See in this context especially [[Glossar-English:Predication|predication]], [[Glossar-English:Nomination|nomination]], [[Glossar-English:Proposition|proposition]] and [[Glossar-English:Context-Building Acts|context-building acts]])</ref> can thereby be motivated via the concept-genetic relations: The usages that are possible according to the simplest conceptual field reconstructed concept-genetically for beings to whom image competence is rightly attributed will also underlie all higher-level image concepts in a more or less differentiated form.


===Partielle Strukturübertragung auf andere Begriffs&shy;felder===
===Partielle Strukturübertragung auf andere Begriffs&shy;felder===

Version vom 7. September 2023, 19:10 Uhr

Main-Item to: Pictoriality: Conditions and Consequences

Original: Auswirkungen der Bildlichkeit


Image competence in concept-genetic considerations

The pictorial quality of an object and, thus, the image competence of the person who deals with that part of their environment (the object) as an image is not a property that can simply be regarded as additively placed next to others. It is interrelated with other properties or competencies in multiple ways, and its conceptual constitution consequently affects the concepts we should make of them. These effects are now the focus.

The concept-genetic consideration is based on using the composition of a questionable conceptual field from simpler, jointly already established conceptual fields as a suggestion to show a skeptical counterpart a rational way to adopt the questionable conceptual field: Namely, that the reference points we use to communicate about common divisions of the world can be extended by certain combinations in such a way that, with the concepts thus obtained, an interesting group of phenomena can be conceived of as systematically connected in the first place.

A concept-genetic reconstruction of an introductory situation of the image concept may, for example, refer to different developmental stages of sign behavior or, more precisely: to a sequence of conceptual fields that allow us to conceive of something in the world as a being with sign behavior of a certain degree of complexity – that is, as something that is capable of behaving in a certain more or less complex way simultaneously to itself, its conspecifics, and its environment. It may play a role in one of the transitions, for instance, that beings of the level just considered sometimes include an actually erroneous perception of their environment in one of their sign acts. If such behavior is seen not only as a contingent coincidence of two intrinsically independent behavioral instances but as an indication of a possible systematic combination of behaviors, a bridge is built for a correspondingly combined notion of a more complex type of behavior.

However, the agent of such behavior is then not simply a being of the same kind as the beings considered before: As a result of the systematic interrelations of concepts in a conceptual field, such a conceptual combination also changes the concept of the entity that is capable of that kind of more complex behavior ([Ros 1979a]Ros, Arno (1979): Objektkonstitution und elementare Sprachhandlungsbegriffe. Hain, Königstein/Ts.
).


Types of effects of concept synthesis

In addition to the central concept here – the concept of image competence – a concept-genetic constitution may also determine a whole series of other concepts that at first do not seem to be readily related to it but which nevertheless belong to the same conceptual field. But these are not the only

Other concepts from the same conceptual field

These “side-effects” of conceptual synthesis concern not only the actual bearer of image competence, negotiated here under the heading ‘homo pictor’, but above all the concepts of resemblance and propositional language, considered here under the heading ‘deceptive and immersive mode’.

Also affected is the concept of objects in the narrower sense, which, at least for an important subclass of images, provides exactly the image content, as well as the ability to free oneself from the respective here and now and thus to be able to enter (in Plessner's words) into an eccentric relation to oneself and one's environment ([Plessner 1928a]Plessner, Helmuth (1928): Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch. W. de Gruyter, Berlin.
Notiz: <sup>3</sup>1975
). Often, these concepts emerge as one branch of a differentiation of a competence already present in beings not capable of image use. Such a differentiation of basic concepts concerns, in particular, the relation of equality, similarity, and identity.

Elementary image concepts and image concepts of a higher order

Another consequence of a concept-genetic consideration of pictoriality understood as image competence is that further, more complex levels can be built (via continued concept-genetic reconstructions) on the elementary concept of pictoriality thus obtained. Between which levels of the pictorial would we have to differentiate? Candidates for higher-level image concepts are, for instance, structural images, reflexively used images, but also of moving or interactive images. Is there even a single elementary image function?

The answer to the question of the actual elementary image function, which ultimately underlies every single image use,[1] can thereby be motivated via the concept-genetic relations: The usages that are possible according to the simplest conceptual field reconstructed concept-genetically for beings to whom image competence is rightly attributed will also underlie all higher-level image concepts in a more or less differentiated form.

Partielle Strukturübertragung auf andere Begriffs­felder

Ob Begriffe wie der der Anschau­ung, der des Vorstel­lungsbil­des oder der der Bildvor­stellung eben­falls als höher­stufi­ge Bildbe­griffe zu verste­hen sind, sei hier dahin­gestellt. Sehr gut möglich wäre auch, dass es sich dabei um eine Folge der Begriffs­synthe­se des Bildbe­griffs ganz ande­rer Art handelt: einer partiel­len Struktur­über­tragung nämlich auf Begriffs­felder für ganz ande­re Phäno­menbe­reiche, d.h.: eine Meta­pher im Sinn der Kogni­tiven Lingu­istik ([Lakoff 1987a]Lakoff, George (1987): Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things – What Categories Reveal about the Mind. Chicago University Press, Chicago.
).[2]

Wer eine Metapher als ein Sprach­“bild” bezeich­net wird meist doch zuge­stehen, dass damit keines­wegs ein Bild im übli­chen Sinn gemeint ist: vielmehr wird der Ausdruck gemein­hin selbst als ein “Sprach­bild” verstan­den. Aller­dings ist die Bezeich­nung dabei auch nicht rein zufäl­lig äqui­vok, wie es etwa bei ‘Bank’ als Garten­möbel und als Finanz­insti­tut der Fall ist. Vielmehr ist die Ähnlich­keit des Ausdrucks durch bestimm­te Ähnlich­keiten in der Erschei­nungswei­se der beiden betrach­teten Phäno­menbe­reiche – bzw. genau­er: unse­rer Argu­menta­tionen zu den Berei­chen moti­viert. Dass ein Teil der begriff­lichen Struktur, also der Argu­mente stiften­den Zusam­menhän­ge zwischen eng verbun­denen Begrif­fen eines unse­rer Begriffs­felder, in einer mehr oder weni­ger weiten, aber stets unvoll­ständi­gen Isom­orphie-Bezie­hung mit der begriff­lichen Struktur eines ganz ande­ren von uns verwen­deten Begriffs­feldes steht ermög­licht uns, über die Phäno­mene, die unter erste­res fallen, in gewis­sen Grenzen so zu reden und so zu argu­mentie­ren, als würde es um Phäno­mene unter dem zweiten Begriffs­feld gehen.

Es handelt sich also um Phäno­mene, die wir als unei­gentli­che Bilder auffas­sen können, sofern nur der Bildbe­griff verfüg­bar ist. So kann beispiels­weise von ‘Lebens­form’ als ‘Weltbild’ nur dann die Rede sein, wenn der Begriff der Lebens­form als partiell struktur­gleich zu dem des betrachteten Bildbe­griffs verstan­den wird: Man kann aber auch ganz ohne Verwen­dung des Bildbe­griffs über dassel­be Phäno­men reden, sofern nicht behaup­tet werden soll, es würde sich dabei tatsäch­lich um eine echte Art von Bild handeln.

Ob und in welchem Sinn schließlich mit dem Ausdruck ‘menta­les Bild’ eine Meta­pher arti­kuliert wird ist Thema des Unter­punkts logi­sche Kontext­bildung und menta­le Bilder, der zugleich zur Diskus­sion der Auswir­kungen der begriffs­gene­tischen Betrach­tungen der Bildlich­keit auf die Begrif­fe der Ähnlich­keit und der Sprache zurück­verweist.

Notes
  1. ↑ See in this context especially predication, nomination, proposition and context-building acts)
  2. ↑ Zu die­sem The­ma exis­tiert ein ei­ge­nes Lem­ma (⊳ sprach­li­che Me­ta­phern und all­ge­mei­ne Me­ta­pho­ro­lo­gie), so dass an die­ser Stel­le auf sei­ne aus­führ­li­che Dis­kus­si­on ver­zich­tet wer­den kann.
Literature
[Lakoff 1987a]Lakoff, George (1987): Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things – What Categories Reveal about the Mind. Chicago University Press, Chicago.[Plessner 1928a]Plessner, Helmuth (1928): Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch. W. de Gruyter, Berlin.[Ros 1979a]Ros, Arno (1979): Objektkonstitution und elementare Sprachhandlungsbegriffe. Hain, Königstein/Ts.

Version 1: 2013

Seitenbearbeitungen durch: Joerg R.J. Schirra — (Hinweis)