Glossar-English:Interactional, Expressive, and Propositional Angles: Unterschied zwischen den Versionen
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== | ==Special partial actions in the use of signs== | ||
Since the use of a [[Zeichen, Zeichenträger, Zeichensystem|sign]] is a special form of [[Interaktion und Kommunikation|communicative interaction]], particularly relevant aspects (in the sense of necessary partial actions) can be derived. On the one hand, every communicative interaction must have aspects that belong to it as a type of interaction. Essentially, it is about the parts of the respective action schemata that all interactions share, such as the roles of ‘sender’ and ‘receiver’ and quite generally the direction of the sign from the sender to the receiver, as well as the type of interaction. This ''interactional angle'' of communicative interaction is expressed, in particular, in the fact that whoever uses a sign is always addressing someone to achieve something. The action components in which the interaction reference is conveyed are the [[Illokution|illocutions]]. | |||
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On the other hand, a sign act necessarily has aspects of a ''communicative'' interaction, including self-presentation in particular. Anyone who uses a sign is not only addressing a recipient; in doing so, they must also relate in a special manner to themselves, to their [[Körper|body]], and the [[Kontext|situational embedding]], in which the action of the sign takes place. The action components in which this ''expressive angle'' of the communicative interaction is conveyed determine, among other things, its [[Modalität|modality]]. | |||
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The state of mind of the sender presented by the expressive angle can finally be differentiated with the use of signs to turn the sender towards an (also fictitious) fact or object: This fact, that object is then ''[[Repräsentation|represented]]'' by the sign. The use of the sign can therefore refer to a specific fact to which the sender wishes to draw the recipient's attention. [[Proposition|Propositions]] form the action components that convey the ''propositional angle'' of a sign action. [1]<ref> | |||
A highly simplified version of the three angles can be found in the so-called „Organon model“ (cf. <bib id='Bühler 1933a'></bib>: p. 28f.). The interaction angle is reduced to the aspect of the ''appeal'': what the sender wants to achieve with the recipient. The expressive angle passes into the aspect of ''expression'': the way in which the sender presents themselves. Finally, the propositional angle appears in the form of the ''[[Darstellung|representation]]'' aspect: that to which the sign points (by means of the expressive angle). For the three aspects, which are also discussed in detail by George H. Mead, see <bib id='Ros 1984a'></bib>.</ref> | |||
== | ==Interactional, expressive, and propositional angles in the use of images == | ||
The problem of the possible ''interactional angles'' of image uses is dealt with in detail in [[Bildpragmatik|image pragmatics]] (⊳ in particular [[Referenz, Denotation, Exemplifikation|Reference, Denotation, Exemplification]]). On a general level, this also concerns the question of whether it is possible to identify a fundamental illocutionary function of image use on which all other uses are based. What is the relationship between this and the assertion in particular (for instance ⊳ [[Kontextbildung|Kontext Building]])? | |||
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As with all sign acts, the interactional angle can also be modified in the use of images by internalizing the respective interaction partners: The image user can take on both roles at the same time and present themselves with an image carrier as an image. In fact, the number of such ''monological'' uses far exceeds that of genuinely ''dialogical'' image communication (⊳ also [[Bildrezeption als Kommunikationsprozess|Image reception as a communication process)]]. | |||
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The ''expressive angle'' of an image use depends less on the distinction between producer and recipient, as one might initially assume than on the type of image: | |||
* | * In figurative imagery, the expressive angle can be paraphrased as: ‘presenting oneself to another (or oneself in the role of another) as actually seeing something which one knows is not actually present’. The ostensive sense of pointing (‘presenting oneself to another – or oneself in the role of another – as someone’) and the deictic sense of pointing (‘to lead someone – or oneself in the role of someone else – to perceive something’) are evidently intertwined in a very specific way (⊳ [[Interaktion und Kommunikation|Interaction and Communication]]). This characterization of the expressive angle in the image use must apply equally to the image producer and the image recipient since dealing with an image carrier can only be an image act if it is connected with such a self-presentation of the agents. | ||
* | * For metaphorically depicting images (⊳ [[Strukturbild|Structural Images]]): ‘presenting oneself to another (or oneself in the role of another) as someone who currently sees something that he knows is not visible in itself’ (⊳ also [[Semantik logischer Bilder|Semantics of Logical Images]]).<ref>Here it is already indicated that the structural images can be understood as a more general class of images, which include the figurative images as a special case. For something that is not present obviously cannot be seen either, even if it is visually perceptible in itself. The general formulation for the expressive angle when using an image is therefore: ‘Presenting oneself to another (or oneself in the role of another) as someone who is currently seeing something that he knows is not visible – either in the current context or in general’.<br/> | ||
The images that do not fall into the two classes mentioned must be [[Bild in reflexiver Verwendung|reflectively used images]] with a deficient representational function (⊳ also [[Semantik ungegenständlicher Bilder|Semantics of non-representational images]]).</ref> | |||
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With regard to the ''propositional angle'' of image uses, one must first ask: Do pictures have a propositional angle at all? If so, how do they accomplish it? Explanations on these predominantly [[Bildsemantik|image-semantic questions]] can be found in the articles on the keywords [[Proposition|Proposition]], [[Prädikation|Predication]], and [[Nomination|Nomination]]. | |||
== | ==Truthfulness and truth== | ||
By dividing a sign act into interactional, expressive, and propositional angles, two important properties can be defined: Whereas ''truthfulness'' is associated with the interactional and expressive angles and assesses the relationship between the actual intention that the sender is pursuing with the sign act and the ostentatiously shown intention, ''truth'' is an evaluation of the propositional angle: the propositional angle of a sign act may or may not agree with the corresponding facts. Since truthfulness does not depend on the propositional angle, it is defined for all communicative interactions and, thus, also for the use of images. | |||
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On the other hand, as long as it is not clear whether every image act has a propositional angle at all, talk of the truth of an image remains metaphorical at best. The concept of truth can only be directly applied to propositional image theories. For purely predicative or nominatory theories of the factual reference in images, the fundamental incompleteness of predication or nomination means that images cannot be directly true or false, but only have to be supplemented with the missing components to form a proposition in the context of use. In modal image theories, on the other hand, the image use provides the [[Kontext|context]], to which related propositions can be true or false; the concept of truth is then not applicable to images themselves. Ultimately, asemiotic image theories must offer a concept of truth that is completely independent of the concept of truth in sign theory, insofar as this aspect is considered at all.<ref> The keyword [[Authentizität|authenticity]] also belongs in this context.</ref> | |||
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Version vom 8. August 2023, 18:17 Uhr
Sub-Item of: Sign theories: Overview
Original: Interaktions-, Selbst- und Sachbezug
Special partial actions in the use of signsSince the use of a sign is a special form of communicative interaction, particularly relevant aspects (in the sense of necessary partial actions) can be derived. On the one hand, every communicative interaction must have aspects that belong to it as a type of interaction. Essentially, it is about the parts of the respective action schemata that all interactions share, such as the roles of ‘sender’ and ‘receiver’ and quite generally the direction of the sign from the sender to the receiver, as well as the type of interaction. This interactional angle of communicative interaction is expressed, in particular, in the fact that whoever uses a sign is always addressing someone to achieve something. The action components in which the interaction reference is conveyed are the illocutions. On the other hand, a sign act necessarily has aspects of a communicative interaction, including self-presentation in particular. Anyone who uses a sign is not only addressing a recipient; in doing so, they must also relate in a special manner to themselves, to their body, and the situational embedding, in which the action of the sign takes place. The action components in which this expressive angle of the communicative interaction is conveyed determine, among other things, its modality. The state of mind of the sender presented by the expressive angle can finally be differentiated with the use of signs to turn the sender towards an (also fictitious) fact or object: This fact, that object is then represented by the sign. The use of the sign can therefore refer to a specific fact to which the sender wishes to draw the recipient's attention. Propositions form the action components that convey the propositional angle of a sign action. [1][1]
Interactional, expressive, and propositional angles in the use of imagesThe problem of the possible interactional angles of image uses is dealt with in detail in image pragmatics (⊳ in particular Reference, Denotation, Exemplification). On a general level, this also concerns the question of whether it is possible to identify a fundamental illocutionary function of image use on which all other uses are based. What is the relationship between this and the assertion in particular (for instance ⊳ Kontext Building)? As with all sign acts, the interactional angle can also be modified in the use of images by internalizing the respective interaction partners: The image user can take on both roles at the same time and present themselves with an image carrier as an image. In fact, the number of such monological uses far exceeds that of genuinely dialogical image communication (⊳ also Image reception as a communication process). The expressive angle of an image use depends less on the distinction between producer and recipient, as one might initially assume than on the type of image:
With regard to the propositional angle of image uses, one must first ask: Do pictures have a propositional angle at all? If so, how do they accomplish it? Explanations on these predominantly image-semantic questions can be found in the articles on the keywords Proposition, Predication, and Nomination.
Truthfulness and truthBy dividing a sign act into interactional, expressive, and propositional angles, two important properties can be defined: Whereas truthfulness is associated with the interactional and expressive angles and assesses the relationship between the actual intention that the sender is pursuing with the sign act and the ostentatiously shown intention, truth is an evaluation of the propositional angle: the propositional angle of a sign act may or may not agree with the corresponding facts. Since truthfulness does not depend on the propositional angle, it is defined for all communicative interactions and, thus, also for the use of images. On the other hand, as long as it is not clear whether every image act has a propositional angle at all, talk of the truth of an image remains metaphorical at best. The concept of truth can only be directly applied to propositional image theories. For purely predicative or nominatory theories of the factual reference in images, the fundamental incompleteness of predication or nomination means that images cannot be directly true or false, but only have to be supplemented with the missing components to form a proposition in the context of use. In modal image theories, on the other hand, the image use provides the context, to which related propositions can be true or false; the concept of truth is then not applicable to images themselves. Ultimately, asemiotic image theories must offer a concept of truth that is completely independent of the concept of truth in sign theory, insofar as this aspect is considered at all.[3] See also:
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Anmerkungen
Literatur
[Bühler 1933a]Bühler, Karl (1933): Axiomatik der Sprachwissenschaften. Klostermann, Frankfurt/M.[Ros 1984a]Ros, Arno (1984): Sach-, Selbst- und Fremdbezug in elementaren sprachlichen Handlungen. Zur Sprachtheorie G. H. Meads. In: Oehler, K. (Hg.), Zeichen und Realität. Stauffenburg, Tübingen. Version 1: 2013 Responsible: Editing: Vorlage:GlosTab5E
[Schirra 2013g-m]Schirra, Jörg R.J. (2013). Interaktions-, Selbst- und Sachbezug. (Ausg. 1). In: Schirra, J.R.J.; Halawa, M. & Liebsch, D. (Hg.), Glossar der Bildphilosophie. (2012-2026). [bildglossar.org/index.php?title=Interaktions-,_Selbst-_und_Sachbezug]. |