Glossar-English:Excursus: Actions

Excursus to: Image reception as a communication process, Interaction and Communication

Original: Exkurs:Handlungen

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Two concepts of action with different scopes Figure 1: Hierarchical embedding of the two concepts of action and their conceptual environment Actions are usually contrasted with mere behavior, whereby the difference to the latter lies in the consciously pursued goal, the actor's purpose of the action as recognized by themselves (cf., for example, [Weber 2005a]Weber, Max (2005): Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie. Zweitausendeins, Frankfurt/M. Notiz: (Orig.: 1921/22) Nicht angezeigt: Zwei Teile in einem Band; Hrsg. von Alexander Ulfig ). For some questions, however, this narrow concept of action should be accompanied by a broader concept. If the concept of action presupposes the conscious setting of goals and, thus, self-awareness, then attempts to explain self-awareness conceptually in terms of action theory must become circular. If, on the other hand, not all actions already presuppose self-awareness, there are opportunities to employ certain constellations of actions in the broader sense as a basis for actions in the narrow sense and, thus, for the introduction of the concept of self-awareness. The presence of an activity carrier characterizes behavior, in general, and also the two action concepts. A particular form of behavior is that of biological activity carriers (see Fig. 1). Whereas no purposes established by evolutionary processes are attributed to the behavior of inanimate activity carriers, for example, articulated with a sentence such as ‘the stone rolls into the valley’, this is undoubtedly true for behavior in the narrower sense, namely of living beings, even if their activity carriers are far from consciously pursuing these purposes themselves: for example, ‘a plant blooms’ for the purpose of reproduction. Actions in the broad sense stand between such behavior (in the narrow sense) and actions in the narrow sense. Although self-awareness cannot be ascribed yet, we can attribute at least being conscious to the biological activity carrier – in particular, having simple forms of cognitions and intentions. An observer interlinks the currently observable activity of the activity carrier with previous (especially in the case of cognitions) and future (especially in the case of intentions) activities, which the observer understands as a unit. Therefore, recognizing an action in the broad sense involves recognizing an action complex of the following form in an activity carrier: ‹doing something now because the activity carrier has previously done something related to it and wants to do something later that is also related to the current activity›. However, the activity carrier, as such, is not aware of this connection. As observers, we can attribute to a dog that we see running towards the food bowl that it has seen the bowl and knows that it usually finds food there (cognition, connection to past activities) and wants to eat immediately (intention, future activity). However, this connection between the activities of different times still occurs entirely at the observer level; although the dog is conscious, it is always entirely in the here and now. Only when the observer concedes to the activity carrier that they can behave relative to the cognitive and intentional aspects of their own actions (initially in the broad sense, then also in the narrow sense) can we speak of »self-awareness« and, hence, of »actions in the narrow sense«. Ultimately, as observers ascribing self-awareness, we can only justify this attribution based on the corresponding behavior and actions of the activity carrier under consideration. However, in contrast to the actions in the broad sense, the attribution also depends on the fact that the activity carrier under consideration presents themselves to the observer as one who ascribes certain cognitions and intentions to themselves and, thus, takes into account the corresponding relationships to the (partial) actions that go beyond the current activity. Therefore, activity carriers of this type differ significantly from those considered involved in actions in the broad sense (or even in behavior). In his 2005 monograph on the matter-mind problem, Arno Ros takes up these distinctions and assigns the activity carrier type »living being« to behavior in the narrow sense, the activity carrier type »action subject« to action in the broad sense, and the activity carrier type »person« to action in the narrow sense (cf. [Ros 2005a]Ros, Arno (2005): Materie und Geist. Eine philosophische Untersuchung. Mentis, Paderborn. : Chapters IV, V and VI). The colloquial subdivision of the concepts for biological activity carriers – into plants (and plant-like lower animals), (higher) animals (and humans that do not behave like persons), and finally, persons – is underpinned here by a corresponding increase in the observable complexity of the behavior of corresponding activity carriers (including potential self-presentations). Action schema and action actualization Behavior and actions – both in the narrow and broad sense – can be thematized in two crucial, interrelated forms: as an individual action actualization, i.e., as an instance, and as a general action schema, i.e., as a type. A concrete action – such as (the action of) reading this sentence at exactly this point in time in exactly this place by this individual action carrier – happens and is then unrepeatably over and finally past. An abstract action schema, on the other hand, such as the action of »reading«, is not situated in space and time and, thus, cannot pass. It can also be performed again (as an instance) any number of times. Depending on the context, an action expression can be utilized to express either of the two perspectives. As a type, the action expression then refers to everything shared by all instantiations of this type – to the corresponding habit of differentiation or the associated concept. In fact, we can only ever approach an instance of action as an instance of a type of action. In the case of actions in the narrower sense, the two perspectives appear particularly as the execution or implementation aspect (token: concretely performing an action according to a schema) on the one hand and as the perception or description aspect (type: recognizing and representing an executed concrete action as the realization of a schema) on the other. Thus, a connection is drawn to the distinction between the observer level (or third-person level, s/he perspective) and the level of the activity carrier (or first-person level, I perspective) (cf., e.g., [Janich 2005a]Janich, Peter (2005): Medienphilosophie der Kommunikation. In: Sandbothe, M. & Nagel (Hg.), Systematische Medienphilosophie. Akademie, Berlin. ). Components of action schemata Action schemata generally determine the elements that occur in all corresponding action instances. As in a play, these include, on the one hand, the roles: the acting persons or action subjects, but also the “props” – all also characterized as types – as variable names, so to speak, for corresponding possible concrete assignments. Only in the concrete execution of the action, analogous to a concrete performance of the play, are these role variables assigned concrete instances of the appropriate object type. On the other hand, the temporally (more or less) ordered system of partial actions is part of the action schema. Here, too, the subplots that determine the plot of a play provide a good, albeit complex, example. There is also a close connection between the concept of partial action and that of the intention to act. Two kinds of action actualization failures With an action actualization, the subject of the action may or may not achieve the intended goal of the action: the action (actualization) is accordingly successful or not. On the other hand, an attempt at actualization can succeed or fail. In the latter case, it does not meet the standard set by the schema. Therefore, these two kinds of success and failure are quite different aspects of the execution of an action, as the well-known original medical comment ‘Operation successful, patient dead’ makes clear, which is also used outside medicine to refer to the execution of an action that correctly instantiates the corresponding schema but has nevertheless failed to achieve its actual intention. The distinction between instantiation success and intention success is particularly significant in actions with more than one subject, i.e., especially in interactions. Here, a distinction can be made between those action schemata whose actualization only successfully achieves the action intentions if several action subjects participate and those that can only successfully instantiate the schema if several action subjects participate. In the first case, we are dealing with an action of the joint action type, and in the second case, with participatory actions, as they are called. A typical example of a joint action is carrying an object if it is so heavy that one person alone cannot manage it. No matter how hard they try and how correctly they update the schema for carrying objects, the object cannot be moved in that manner. An example of a participatory action is race: One alone does not even succeed in actualizing the schema because the schema here necessarily provides for the role of a competitor of the object type »action subject«. With such a competitor, the schema may be instantiated correctly, and the first actor may succeed in the race's intention by winning it. Effects on communication and sign (action) concepts Obviously, all interactions are participatory actions, as interaction schemata can only be instantiated correctly if multiple actor roles are occupied. As a specific form of interaction, this also applies to communication and sign acts. In the case of sign actions, however, it is perfectly legitimate for the two roles (sender and receiver) to be taken on by the same person – that is a consequence of the definition of sign acts as those communication schemata in which the actors consciously pursue the purpose of the action themselves (and do not merely complete evolutionarily established or individual-historically trained expressive movements). Introducing the broad concept of action makes it possible to consider those communicative interactions that the actors do not consciously use for communicative purposes as communications in the full sense, too. That applies, for example, to signals in animals. If only the narrow concept of action is taken as a basis, all communications necessarily become sign actions because these are determined by conscious usage for communicative purposes, characteristic of the narrow concept of action.

Notes Literature [Janich 2005a]Janich, Peter (2005): Medienphilosophie der Kommunikation. In: Sandbothe, M. & Nagel (Hg.), Systematische Medienphilosophie. Akademie, Berlin.[Plessner 1928a]Plessner, Helmuth (1928): Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch. W. de Gruyter, Berlin.[Ros 1979a]Ros, Arno (1979): Objektkonstitution und elementare Sprachhandlungsbegriffe. Hain, Königstein/Ts.[Ros 1989/90a]Ros, Arno (1989): Begründung und Begriff. Wandlungen des Verständnisses begrifflicher Argumentationen. Meiner, Hamburg.[Ros 2005a]Ros, Arno (2005): Materie und Geist. Eine philosophische Untersuchung. Mentis, Paderborn.[Weber 2005a]Weber, Max (2005): Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie. Zweitausendeins, Frankfurt/M. Version 1: 2013 Responsible: Schirra, Jörg R.J. Editing: Sachs-Hombach, Klaus Contributions by: Joerg R.J. Schirra und Marcel Lemmes — (Note) Quote as: Schirra, Jörg R.J. (2013). Excursus: Actions. (Ausg. 1). In: Schirra, J.R.J.; Halawa, M. & Liebsch, D. (Hg.), Glossar der Bildphilosophie. (2012-2026). [bildglossar.org/index.php?title=Glossar-English:Excursus:_Actions].